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I. INTRODUCTION
In the United States, principal control over the purse, both the
taxing and the spending powers, is lodged in the Congress. Our sys-
tem of separation of governmental powers, with its inherent checks
and balances, is designed, however, to ensure that Congress does not
usurp the powers of the executive and judicial branches. Thus, in the
words of James Madison in The Federalist, the Constitution prevents
Congress from becoming too "ambitious" and overstepping the
bounds of the legitimate exercise of its fiscal, as well as its other,
* Professor of Law, Catholic University School of Law. The author would like to thank
the following individuals for their cogent and helpful comments on earlier drafts of this
Article: Larry Alexander, Michael Asimow, Boris Bittker, Kenneth Culp Davis, Richard
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powers. I
The primacy of the congressional role in making fiscal laws is
rooted in the fact that Congress is the most accountable to the electo-
rate of the three governmental branches. As Chief Justice Marshall
noted in McCulloch v. Maryland, the people delegated fiscal lawmak-
ing to the Congress and thus the people themselves have the ultimate
power to determine the legitimacy of congressional acts: "The only
security against the abuse of [the taxing] power, is found in the struc-
ture of government itself. In imposing a tax the legislature acts upon
its constituents. This is in general a sufficient security against errone-
ous and oppressive taxation."2
In the American system, therefore, the structure of the govern-
ment is intended to prevent the government from oppressing the peo-
ple. The three branches of government are set off against each other
to prevent any one of them from accumulating too much power, and
to limit their ability-in particular the ability of the political
branches-to combine forces, imposing burdensome government on
the people. As Justice Brandeis noted in Myers v. United States:
[T]he doctrine of the separation of powers was adopted by the
Convention of 1787, not to promote efficiency but to preclude the
exercise of arbitrary power. The purpose was, not to avoid fric-
tion, but, by means of the inevitable friction incident to the distri-
bution of the governmental powers among three departments, to
save the people from autocracy.
Thus the issue becomes whether theoretical underpinnings of our
constitutional system are borne out in the way the process currently
makes internal taxation laws. There is constant criticism of the tax
legislative process. Professors Doernberg and McChesney, drawing
on the economic theory of regulation, 4 have criticized the tax legisla-
tive process, suggesting that the current system will always produce
laws that increase private benefits rather than public goods.' Profes-
I. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 26 (J. Madison) (G. Wills ed. 1982).
2. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). But see 3 F. HAYEK, LAW,
LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY 127 (1979):
The theory and practice of public finance has been shaped almost entirely by the
endeavor to disguise as far as possible the burden imposed, and to make those
who bear it as little aware of it as possible. It is probable that the whole
complexity of the tax structure we have built up is largely the result of efforts to
persuade citizens to give up more than they willingly would consent to do.
3. 272 U.S. 52, 293 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
4. See Posner, Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. Scr. 335
(1974); Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. Scl. 3 (1971).
For a general discussion of the theory, see Kalt & Zupan, Capture and Ideology in the
Economic Theory of Politics, 74 AM. EcON. REV. 279 (1980).
5. See Doernberg & McChesney, On the Accelerating Rate and Decreasing Durability of
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sors Brennan and Buchanan, leading public finance theorists, have
proposed that the constitutional system needs more procedural con-
straints to prevent Congress from increasing spending and taxing in a
manner that harms the people.6 Others have criticized the tax law-
making process in less fundamental ways, but their voices have added
to the chorus of dissatisfaction about the current system. Criticism of
the process provides useful tools for analyzing the tax legislative pro-
cess and making it more responsive to the general public interest.'
Most current criticism, however, fails to explore the impact of the
tripartite structure of American government on tax lawmaking. This
Article addresses that missing linkage by assessing the role of Con-
gress in tax lawmaking using a traditional separation of powers analy-
sis. The analysis considers Congress's role in tax lawmaking and how
its actions fit within the strictures on government provided in the
Constitution. The essential question is how taxing power should be
distributed among the branches of the federal government.
Section II of this Article focuses on the criticisms of tax lawmak-
ing procedures made by Professors Doernberg and McChesney and
Professors Brennan and Buchanan. It demonstrates how their lack of
a separation of powers analysis causes them to fall short of addressing
more fundamental problems in the current system.
Section III presents a theory of separation of powers within the
context of tax lawmaking. That theory suggests that if Congress were
to write less complex tax laws it would exercise its legislative power
Tax Reform, 71 MINN. L. REV. 913 (1987) [hereinafter Tax Reform]; Doemberg &
McChesney, Doing Good or Doing Well?: Congress and the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (Book
Review), 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 891 (1987) [hereinafter Doernberg & McChesney, Book Review].
6. G. BRENNAN & J. BUCHANAN, THE POWER TO TAX: ANALYTICAL FOUNDATIONS
OF A FISCAL CONSTITUTION (1980). See also TAX AND EXPENDITURE LIMITATIONS (H.
Ladd & J. Tideman eds. 1981); THE CONSTITUTION AND THE BUDGET (W. Moore & R.
Posner eds. 1980).
7. For general descriptions of the tax legislative process, see 4 B. BITrKER, FEDERAL
TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES & GIFTS § 116.1 (1981); Gallagher, The Tax Legislative
Process, 3 REV. TAX'N INDIVIDUALS 203 (1979); and Ferguson, Hickman & Lubick,
Reexamining the Nature and Role of Tax Legislative History in Light of the Changing Realities
of the Process, 67 TAXES 804, 808-12 (1989). For a political science perspective on the tax
legislative process, see J. WITITE, THE POLITICS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FEDERAL
INCOME TAX (1985). See also T. REESE, THE POLITICS OF TAXATION (1980); Evans, The
Condition of the Tax Legislative Process, 39 TAX NOTES 151 (1988); Leonard, Perspectives on
the Tax Legislative Process, 38 TAX NOTES 969 (1988); McDaniel, Federal Income Tax
Simplification: The Political Process, 34 TAX L. REV. 27 (1977); Waris, Practical and
Philosophical Observations on the Tax Legislative Process, 38 N.Y.U. INST. ON FED. TAX'N ch.
30 (1980). For an interesting account by two Wall Street Journal staffers of the process of
"tax reform" leading up to the enactment of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, see J. BIRNBAUM &
A. MURRAY, SHOWDOWN AT GUCCi GULCH: LAWMAKERS, LOBBYISTS AND THE
UNLIKELY TRIUMPH OF TAX REFORM (1987).
1991] 1007
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol.45:1005
more closely to the manner intended by the Constitution. This con-
clusion does not suggest greater procedural restraints on Congress but
rather argues for its more faithful adherence to the structure of law-
making as described in the Constitution. This analysis suggests that
Congress would better serve the fundamental underpinnings of our
democratic traditions by leaving more of the burden of administering
tax laws to the executive branch.8
The analysis, however, does not include a prescription for con-
vincing Congress that it should not become so involved in the details
of tax legislation. Congress' behavior is schizophrenic. On the one
hand, it frequently avoids addressing hard political choices. On the
other hand, it retains control over many detailed technical areas that
have a considerable impact on taxpayers. That problem, however,
must be cured by.po'litical remedies, not legal analysis. The Supreme
Court should not strike down an excessively detailed statute on the
theory that Congress has delegated executive functions to its own
agents. Nothing in the Constitution prevents Congress from legislat-
ing in as much detail as it wants-only prudence does that.
II. CRITIQUING THE CRITICS
A discussion of two criticisms of the federal tax legislative pro-
cess-those of Professors Doernberg and McChesney, and of Profes-
sors Brennan and Buchanan-sets the stage for a separation of powers
analysis. While both of these analyses critique congressional actions
and provide instructive insights into the current system, neither grap-
ples with fundamental questions about Congress's proper role in law
making and the appropriate distribution of powers among the
branches. The effectiveness of these criticisms diminishes as a result.
A. The Contract Theory of Professors Doernberg and McChesney
One of the principal public policy concerns in recent years has
been the amount of tax legislation written in response to lobbying by
private interests9 rather than to the general public need for fairer and
8. It should be noted that this position is inconsistent with one this writer has taken in
the past. See Simon, Base Broadening Proposals and Fringe Benefits, 29 ST. Louis U.L.J. 1201,
1214-15 (1985) (stating that "in the absence of statutory specificity, regulatory specificity will
be needed-a solution that is unappealing because of the need to rely on the IRS for policy
determinations that are within the scope of congressional authority." (citation omitted)). In
the process of the lengthy analysis of tax lawmaking as a whole that preceded this article and
that is ongoing, the author has come to see a greater need for reliance on the executive branch
to make law.
9. See J. BIRNBAUM & A. MURRAY, supra note 7; J. WITTE, supra note 7, ch. 16. See
generally P. STERN, THE BEST CONGRESS MONEY CAN BUY 78 (1989) (noting that Bob Dole
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more efficient tax laws. Professors Doernberg and McChesney, in two
recent articles,' 0 have explained how and why this happens. In addi-
tion, they have offered a theory of bargaining between legislators and
private interests for the provision of private goods and have applied it
to the tax legislative process.II Additionally, they have detailed the
way money is spent to influence the tax legislative process.'
2
Doernberg and McChesney's thesis is that legislators auction
their services as providers of private goods by writing tax legislation,
for a fee, to benefit special interests. They receive financial rewards in
the form of political action committee ("PAC") contributions, speak-
ers' fees, travel expenses, and other emoluments because they are will-
ing to enter into contracts with the private sector that will be
performed by the enactment or defeat of certain legislation. In the
view of Doernberg and McChesney, this contractual relationship
between legislators and special interests has contributed to the com-
plexity and frequency of change in the federal tax laws.
Although the observations of Doernberg and McChesney may be
accurate, the thesis they derive from those observations explains only
a small part of why the federal tax lawmaking process works as it
does. In fact, the process is far too complicated to have the bargain-
ing they envision play a substantial part in general legislative
outcomes.
In addition, the tension that exists between a legislator's role as
trustee for the public interest and as the representative of particular
constituencies causes compromises on points that have little or noth-
ing to do with whether a PAC has made a contribution to the legisla-
tor's campaign fund. Because each member of Congress must
respond to many interests, both public and private (with frequently
conflicting views), it is quite probable that many political "bargains"
receives a large number of PAC contributions because, "as the senior Republican on the
Finance Committee, he can offer crucial assistance to anyone desiring (or hoping to protect) a
tax loophole worth hundreds of millions or even billions of dollars."). With respect to special
tax provisions, see Stem, How Would You Like A Special Tax Law, All Your Own? in THE
RAPE OF THE TAXPAYER 34-59 (1974); Surrey, Congress and the Tax Lobbyists-How Special
Tax Provisions Get Enacted, 70 HARV. L. REV. 1145 (1957); see also D. BARLETT & J.
STEELE, THE GREAT TAX GIVEAWAY (1988) (originally published as a series of articles in the
Philadelphia Enquirer, Apr. 10-16, 1988) (addressing special provisions contained in the Tax
Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085).
10. See Doernberg & McChesney, Book Review, supra note 5; Doemberg & McChesney,
Tax Reform, supra note 5.
11. The theory is derived from earlier work by various economists and, lawyers. See
Posner, supra note 4; Stigler, supra note 4. For criticism of Posner and others who use
contract analysis to frame the issues about legislative actions, see Rose-Ackerman, Progressive
Law and Economics--and the New Administrative Law, 98 YALE L.J. 341 (1988).
12. See Doernberg & McChesney, Tax Reform, supra note 5, at 934-45.
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are never actually consumated. Analyses of congressional voting
behavior support this observation.' 3 Indeed, Doernberg and McChes-
ney themselves note that the contracts they refer to are merely execu-
tory, suggesting that they frequently will not produce the desired
results. '4
Legislators inevitably face difficult choices in determining which
interests to serve in the course of enacting legislation.'" Special inter-
ests tend to be vocal minorities whose views are of little or no interest
to apathetic majorities. Although the special interests may be well
funded, money only talks, it does not vote, and apathetic majorities
do. Although money helps legislators get their views across to the
voters, reelection depends on more than money.' 6 Thus the legisla-
tors, intent on remaining in their elected positions, must appeal to a
broader range of voters than the special interests who have contrib-
uted to their reelection campaigns. Most of their legislative activities
reflect that need.
17
Despite the validity of these observations, it is nonetheless true
that Congress enacts special interest tax legislation every time it
passes a tax bill. The easiest special interest provisions to identify are
the "private bills" that benefit only a given project or taxpayer. It is
hard to reconcile such special laws with the general public need for
fairer and more efficient taxation.'" The existence of such private tax
laws, particularly when buried in a lengthy technical tax bill, raises
serious questions about the way Congress exercises its legislative pow-
ers. These questions, addressed in Section III, are not considered by
Professors Doernberg and McChesney.
In addition to private legislation, both financial and political
13. See D. MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION 43-49 (1974).
14. See Doemberg & McChesney, Book Review, supra note 5, at 899; Doernberg &
McChesney, Tax Reform, supra note 5, at 945-52.
15. See D. MAYHEW, supra note 13, at 67-73; M. FIORINA, CONGRESS, KEYSTONE OF
THE WASHINGTON ESTABLISHMENT 81-93 (1977).
16. Constituent casework is also an important part of getting reelected. See M. FIORINA,
supra note 15, at 93-97; D. MAYHEW, supra note 13, at 54-59; Aranson, Gellhorn & Robinson,
A Theory of Legislative Delegation, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 30-33 (1982).
17. See M. FIORINA, supra note 15, at 83-101; D. MAYHEW, supra note 13, at 67-69;
Aranson, Gellhorn & Robinson, supra note 16, at 37-41. See also D. ARNOLD, CONGRESS
AND THE BUREAUCRACY 26-35 (1979); Fiorina & Noll, Voters, Legislators and Bureaucracy:
Institutional Design in the Public Sector, 68 AM. ECON. REV. 256 (1978) (describing
constituent casework and its effect on the functioning of administrative agencies); Peltzman,
Constituent Interest and Congressional Voting, 27 J.L. & EcoN. 181, 183 (1984) (stating "that
when 'constituent interest' is given more appropriate empirical characterization than it has had
up to now, it plays a far larger, even dominant, role in congressional voting, and party and
ideology correspondingly smaller roles, than heretofore believed").
18. See infra Section III (discussing separation of powers).
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powers influence legislators to obtain the outcomes desired by, and
more helpful to, particular industries or groups. The most striking
recent example was the intense lobbying and massive political gift-
giving by the banking industry to obtain the repeal of the withholding
tax on interest and, only incidentally, on dividends.1 9 Nevertheless,
empirical evidence of this kind does not necessarily support the eco-
nomic theory of regulation or the contract theory of Professors
Doernberg and McChesney any more than it supports the traditional
interest group theories of political action by legislatures.20 Further-
more, this kind of interest accomodation is precisely what the Consti-
tution contemplates. Majoritarian decisionmaking and political
compromise inevitably will result in the enactment of legislation that
satisifies the desires of powerful lobbies.
The problem Professors Doernberg and McChesney discuss is of
great importance to our system of government. The amount of
money spent by special interest groups in the pursuit of influencing
legislative outcomes is staggering.2' However, Doernberg and
McChesney plead for campaign spending reforms only, and better sal-
aries and higher ethical standards for the members of Congress. They
do not question whether Congress is overstepping the bounds placed
upon it by the Constitution. Thus, they do not come to grips with the
question of whether the fundamentals of the constitutional system
suggest a more probing analysis of the problems they identify.
B. Spending Limitations and Their Implications for the Tax
Lawmaking Process
Another fundamental criticism of the way the American system
makes its fiscal policies is that Congress fails to control the spending
side of the budget. Although such controls do not focus directly on
taxation, the link between spending and taxing is clear: the two are
inextricably intertwined parts of the fiscal policy process.2 2 Thus, any
19. See Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 324
[hereinafter TEFRA] (outlining requirements for dividend and interest withholding); see also
Anderson, On the Unlikelihood of Sensible Tax Reform, 4 AM. J. TAX POL'Y 81, 97-104 (1985)
(discussing the enactment and repeal of dividend and interest holding requirements contained
in TEFRA).
20. See M. FIORINA, supra note 15, at 61-77; D. MAYHEW, supra note 13, at 40-54.
21. See L. SABATO, PAC POWER: INSIDE THE WORLD OF POLITICAL ACTION
COMMITTEES 12-13 (1984); Sabato, The Political Parties and PACs: Novel Relationships in the
New System of Campaign Finance, 3 J.L. & POL. 423, 424-25 (1987); Sorauf, Political Parties
and Political Action Committees: Two Life Cycles, 22 ARIZ. L. REV. 445 (1980). For an
earlier discussion of the influence of private interests on the legislative process, see N.
ORNSTEIN & S. ELDER, INTEREST GROUPS, LOBBYING AND POLICYMAKING (1978).
22. See Simon, The Budget Process and the Tax Law, 40 TAX NOTES 627 (1988), reprinted
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change in constitutional procedures that affects the spending side of
the budget inevitably affects the taxing side. It is important, therefore,
to consider the wisdom of proposals for a balanced budget amend-
ment, which, if followed to the letter, would inhibit congressional
action on taxing and spending. Professors Brennan and Buchanan
explain one such proposal in The Power to Tax: Analytical Founda-
tions of a Fiscal Constitution.23 With that work as a discussion piece,
this Subsection critiques proposals for greater controls on congres-
sional power, using a separation of powers analysis.
Brennan and Buchanan believe that the current structure of gov-
ernment does not adequately control the spending power of Congress.
Their thesis is rooted in the public-choice view of how legislatures act,
which is similar to the views of Doernberg and McChesney. 24 Recog-
nizing that self-aggrandizement is only possible for a public official if
she can be reelected, the public choice model assumes that legislators
ordinarily will do whatever they can to stay in power. This means, of
course, that legislators will cause the government to spend money for
both public and private goods because the public desires them.
Having spent the money that way, it becomes inevitable, accord-
ing to the theory of public choice, that legislators must raise taxes to
pay for the increased spending they have authorized or to raise funds
in some other way, such as by borrowing. If too much borrowing
occurs, that too will lead to increased taxation because the public will
not want public expenditures cut back. And so the process of more
spending breeding more taxing perpetuates itself.2" This admittedly
pessimistic view of the world has at least some support in recent
history.
There are, however, serious flaws in using the public-choice the-
ory to justify a balanced-budget amendment as Brennan and
Buchanan have done. Reducing taxing by reducing spending cer-
tainly seems to be an appropriate method for dealing with budget defi-
cits, but whether Congress should retain its power to choose between
a balanced budget and one that is not is a question that relates to the
basic structure of our constitutional system. Many critics have sug-
gested that spending limitations simply will not work because, in
in 17 CAP. U.L. REV. 455 (1989). For an examination of the impact of the budget process on
the complexity of tax legislation, see McLure, The Budget Process and Tax Simplification/
Complication, 45 TAX. L. REVIEW 25 (1989).
23. See G. BRENNAN & J. BUCHANAN, supra note 6.
24. Both Brennan and Buchanan and Doernberg and McChesney express cynicism about
the ability of Congress to function in the public interest. This cynicism is shared by many. See
supra note 10.
25. See G. BRENNAN & J. BUCHANAN, supra note 6, at 163-64.
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terms of practical realities, legislators will resort to budgeting tricks to
avoid the limits.26
More important, the public also seems to tolerate a high level of
spending and is just as likely to allow such tricks under a balanced-
budget amendment. Admittedly, however, in our system, which
holds that congressional power derives directly from the people, the
people will not support tax laws that increase their burdens intolera-
bly. Yet a balanced-budget amendment is no more than a bookkeep-
ing leash from which a strong dog can escape easily. Despite cosmetic
appeal, it would have no real impact on the actual deficit.
Assuming for purposes of discussion, however, that such an
amendment would have some effect on the outcomes of the tax legis-
lative process, a more fundamental criticism of the balanced-budget
amendment can be made. For the amendment to be effective, it must
necessarily reduce the power of Congress to make policy choices-the
very role delegated to Congress under the Constitution. Thus, such
an amendment would severely impede the operation of the political
process as envisioned by the Constitution. In fact, the impact of the
current budget reduction law, Gramm-Rudman-Hollings and the
more recent "pay-go" amendments,27 on the tax-policy process has
been severe. In recent years, numerous examples of revenue concerns
that have outweighed policy concerns, provide anecdotal evidence to
support the notion that balanced budget rules-when they work-
frequently result in bad policy choices.2"
Although a balanced-budget amendment can provide some con-
26. See A. WILDAVSKY, THE POLITICS OF THE BUDGETARY PROCESS (4th ed. 1979);
Olson, Is the Balanced Budget Amendment Another Form of Prohibition? in THE
CONSTITUTION AND THE BUDGET 91-94 (W. Moore & R. Penner eds. 1980).
27. Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-177, 99
Stat. 1038, amended by Pub. L. No. 100-119, 101 Stat. 574 (1987) (amended to reflect the
Supreme Court decision in Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986), which held
unconstitutional certain portions of the prior law on separation of powers grounds). See infra
text accompanying notes 101-09. Further amendments of the 1985 legislation (and of the
underlying 1974 Congressional Budget Act) were made in 1990. See Ominibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-239, 103 Stat. 2106. The amendments alter many
of the technical aspects of the 1985 legislation but generally continue to prohibit new
legislation from adding to the deficit in any way.
28. A proposal in the House Ways and Means Committee during the pendency of the 1989
tax and budget legislation would have paid for the extension of the effective date for the repeal
of Section 133 (the popular interest exclusion for Employee Stock Option Plans ("ESOPs"))
for one month by repealing the remaining deduction for consumer interest. See House
Taxwriters Approve $5.3 Billion Bill; Scheduled to Act on Major Proposals This Week, 44 TAX
NOTES 247, 250 (1989). The ESOP extension was designed principally to benefit the banks
financing the acquisition of employer stock by an ESOP. The consumer interest phaseout
repeal, while not having a great effect on a significant number of taxpayers (the amount of
consumer interest deductible in 1990 was 10% and was available only to itemizers),
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trol over Congress (unless, of course, Congress consistently evades its
strictures), it is not the sort of control Congress needs. Congress's
proper role in the tax lawmaking process is a very dynamic one. Con-
gress should have considerable flexibility to balance needs and inter-
ests and to work out political compromises that create sound tax
policy for the people of the country as a whole. A balanced-budget
amendment cannot further that endeavor. It is more important,
therefore, to focus on the issues presented by the way Congress inter-
acts with the other branches in making tax law, and to assess whether
the separation of powers doctrine suggests some changes in its
actions.
III. EXERCISING LEGISLATIVE POWER
Congress's enactment of tax legislation generally follows the pro-
cedural requirements of the constitutional separation of powers doc-
trine as enunciated in recent Supreme Court jurisprudence. Congress
enacts tax laws bicamerally and presents them to the President for
signature or veto.29 It also tends not to delegate to the executive
branch the power to make tax policy, but retains the crucial authority
to make such decisions.30 There are, however, three aspects of Con-
gress's tax lawmaking that call into question whether its legislative
power in the tax area is "exercised in accord with a single, finely
wrought and exhaustively considered, procedure," as required by the
Constitution.
31
nevertheless was a benefit for individual taxpayers, not banks. The Committee apparently saw
the light and reinstated the consumer interest deduction one week later.
Another more important example is the failure of Congress to enact dividend relief in
1986 despite the widespread belief that the double taxation of dividends has detrimental effects
on the economy. See Graetz, The Tax Aspects of Leveraged Buyouts and Other Corporate
Financial Restructuring Transactions, 42 TAX NOTES 721 (1989); Warren, Recent Corporate
Restructuring and the Corporate Tax System, 42 TAX NOTES 715 (1989); ALI Federal Income
Tax Project Subchapter C (1982); ALI Federal Income-Tax Project Subchapter C (Reporter's
Study Draft June, 1989). In 1984 the Treasury proposed a form of dividend relief to achieve
partial integration. See TREASURY DEP'T, 2 TAX REFORM FOR FAIRNESS, SIMPLICITY AND
ECONOMIC GROWTH 152-72 (1984) [hereinafter TREASURY I]. For a discussion of the
TREASURY I proposal and how it fared in Congress, see Simon, Comments on the Dividends
Paid Deduction of HR 3838, 31 TAX NOTES 609 (1986); see also H. AARON, THE IMPOSSIBLE
DREAM COMES TRUE IN TAX REFORM AND THE U.S. ECONOMY 53-55 (1987) (noting that
the failure to enact Treasury's proposed dividend relief was one of the major failures of the Tax
Reform Act of 1986).
29. The importance of both bicameralism and presentment for the enactment of legislation
in accordance with our constitutional structure are made clear in INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919
(1982). See infra accompanying text notes 116-129.
30. See infra accompanying text notes 140-164 (discussing the requirement that
policymaking not be delegated by the Congress).
31. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 951.
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First, Congress as a whole does not understand much of the
detailed tax legislation it enacts, which tends to reduce its accounta-
bility to the public.32 Second, by keeping so much tax detail for itself,
Congress deprives the executive branch of a more dynamic role in the
tax-policy process, one that the Constitution entrusts to it.33 Third,
Congress' special tax laws that benefit only a selected few suggest that
Congress does not always exercise its majoritarian and balancing
role. In a sense, such special legislation involves a redelegation by
32. Accountability requires responsiveness to the will of the people. See D. EPSTEIN,
POLITICAL THEORY OF THE FEDERALIST 147-61 (1984). There can be no accountability
where there is no understanding. For an analysis of the lack of responsiveness to the public of
the government as a whole, see Aranson & Ordeshook, Public Interest, Private Interest and the
Democratic Polity, in THE DEMOCRATIC STATE 87 (R. Benjamin & S. Elkin eds. 1985).
Commentary by two former Assistant Secretaries of the Treasury for Tax Policy suggests
that there is no other possible way for the members to act:
In substance, if not in form, the elected members of Congress have delegated
substantial authority to staff with respect to the technical details of tax
legislation. There is no realistic alternative. Members are not equipped to play
the role of senior law partner who might review the technical work of a junior
partner or associate. . . . Like the expertise of tax counsel generally, staff
expertise is relied upon to produce technical implementation of the general
conceptual decisions of nonexperts.
Ferguson, Hickman & Lubick, supra note 7, at 810-11.
The role of the staffs and their "dominance" in the tax legislative process suffers frequent
criticism. See, e.g., J. BIRNBAUM & A. MURRAY, SHOWDOWN AT GUCCi GULCH, supra note
7, at 217 (criticism from members of Congress of the staff); Chapoton, Perspective From Tax
Practitioners in TRANSCRIPT OF FEDERAL BAR ASSOCIATION TAX SECTION CONFERENCE ON
THE TAX-WRITING PROCESS 55 (1986) (criticism from a former Assistant Secretary of the
Treasury for Tax Policy). For an example of the influence that a staff person working directly
for a member can have on tax policy, see Gina Despres, Legislative Assistant to Senator Bill
Bradley, in Effron, Tax Titans: Three Lawyers'Key Roles in Reform, NAT'L L.J., July 7, 1986,
at 1, col. 1. A discussion of the roles of the congressional tax-writing committees and their
staffs that will be helpful to those who are less well-versed in the tax legislative process is in
The Joint Committee on Taxation, 11 TAX ADVISER 181 (1980); see also Ferguson, Hickman
& Lubick, supra note 7, at 810-12. For a general discussion of the growth and role of congres-
sional staff and their effect on the legislative process as a whole, see Strauss, Legislative Theory
and the Rule of Law: Some Comments on Rubin, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 427, 430-34 (1989).
33. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. The interaction between the legislative and executive
branches in the tax lawmaking process is not the principal consideration of Article II. Thus,
the analysis only touches tangentially on the way in which the judicial branch interacts with
the legislative branch and the separation of powers concerns that may arise in that context. It
is clear, however, that if Congress were to write simpler laws-as proposed herein-the courts
would be called upon to play a greater role in the lawmaking process than they do currently.
For general discussions of the judicial role versus that of agencies, see Farina, Statutory
Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 452
(1989); Rubin, Law and Legislation in the Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 369
(1989). Rubin's article, which considers constitutional aspects of the fiscal lawmaking
structure, compliments Professor Kenneth Dam's article, The American Fiscal Constitution, 44
U. CHt. L. REV. 271 (1977). Professor Dam focused this article on federalism, whereas this
Article focuses on separation of powers. Both concern the sharing of power over raising and
spending revenue.
34. The American system resolves the tension among the various interests in the various
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Congress of its legislative power to the vocal interests themselves.35
All of these issues have important implications for our constitutional
system and the question of whether it functions effectively to permit
the writing of tax laws that benefit the people as a whole.
A. Congressional Accountability
The first of the three reasons for suggesting that Congress is not
writing tax laws in harmony with its constitutional role is based on
the of congressional accountability when the laws reduction are
overly complex. Because our constitutional system is premised on the
idea that the most accountable branch of government should have the
most responsibility in the lawmaking process, it is useful to examine
whether or not congressional accountability is a reality in our current
system for making tax laws.
Congressional accountability has two essential aspects to it. The
first requires that the members be accountable to the public that elects
them. If this form of accountability is present, the public, by under-
standing the legislation that the members have voted for or against,
will be able to vote in an informed way in deciding whether to return
incumbents to office. This aspect of accountability is difficult to
achieve because of the complexity of tax legislation. Thus, the mem-
bers of Congress can never be fully accountable to the people, for peo-
ple who do not understand the tax laws are incapable of being
informed voters complex tax issues. However, the public can achieve
a degree of understanding of broad aspects of tax policy, and Con-
gress should write broad legislation as one means of enhancing its
accountability to the people.
The other, and equally important, aspect of accountability is that
the members of Congress themselves should be able to understand the
legislation they are voting on in order to ascertain whether it is in the
interests of the national constituency or the more narrowly focused
local constituencies each represents. Under this theory of accounta-
bility, the ability to represent either a narrow constituency or the
parts of the country through the legislative process. For a description of the kinds of
compromises that were needed, to enact the first income tax see R. PAUL, TAXATION FOR
PROSPERITY 11-14 (1947); Brownlee, Taxation for a Strong and Virtuous Republic, 45 TAX
NOTES 1613 (1989). The 1986 Act, for example, required compromises for the timber interests
in the Northwest (depreciation write-offs and capital gains), oil and gas interests in the
Southwest (depletion allowances), farming interests in the Midwest (myriad special rules for
farmers), and the interests of the high tax states of the Northeast (whose citizens stood to
suffer the most from repeal of the deduction for state and local taxes). Obviously all such
special rules could not survive in the general base-broadening effort of the 1986 Act. See Tax
Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 [hereinafter 1986 Act].
35. See infra Subsection II.C.
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national interest is equated with the ability to understand the legisla-
tion. Many members of Congress are not accountable to their constit-
uents under this definition of accountability because the technical and
intricate tax laws they write are not comprehensible, even to the legis-
lators themselves. The extent of their knowledge may be greater than
that of the public as a whole, but it is probably not much greater.
Given the broad range of complex subjects over which Congress
has jurisdiction, there is nothing constitutionally impermissible for
the Congress as a whole to satisfy the second aspect of accountability
by delegating the requirement of understanding to a few of its mem-
bers so that they may act on its behalf. Thus, it is proper for the
Congress to delegate the need to have refined expertise in a particular
area of knowledge to substantive committees with jurisdiction over
the subject matter. In fact, this is what Congress has done with
respect to the tax laws by delegating to the members of the Ways and
Means and Finance Committees and the Joint Committee on Taxa-
tion the responsibility for having a greater understanding and knowl-
edge of tax issues than the membership at large.36 Nevertheless, in
light of Congress's tendency to write current tax laws with arcane
terminology and specific effects on complicated financial arrange-
ments, many of the committee members to whom the responsibility
has been delegated may not understand the import of the legislation
they vote to bring to the floor of the Congress.37
This is problematic because it raises questions about the way
Congress presently operates within our constitutional structure. Con-
gress has permitted the further delegation of much of the writing of
legislative details in the tax area to the expert staff of the tax-writing
committees, thus permitting the creation of complex legislation for
lhich there is no actual congressional accountability. 38 Tax legisla-
tion should be written in such a way that the members of the two tax-
writing committees can comprehend the proposals on which they
vote; otherwise their votes are not informed and they are not account-
able to the larger body from which they received their delegation and,
36. The Joint Committee on Taxation arose from the Revenue Act of 1926, Pub. L. No.
20, 44 Stat. 9. Its authority and functions are decribed in sections 8021 to 8023 of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1986. See I.R.C. §§ 8021-8023 (1986), see also Ferguson, Hickman &
Lubick, supra note 7, at 810-12.
37. The Ferguson, Hickman and Lubick article considers the legislators' lack of
understanding to be appropriate because of the technical nature of tax legislation. See
Ferguson, Hickman & Lubick, supra note 7, at 809, 811. That is, of course, entirely contrary
to the view expressed here.
38. The use of staff for drafting insulates the members from legislation and in the process
reduces their accountability. Even if such a result may be "inevitable" if tax legislation is
complicated, it is not right. But see Ferguson, Hickman & Lubick, supra note 32.
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via their representatives, to the people. Where the proposals are
largely incomprehensible, the committee members, as the appropriate
delegates of the larger body, do not exercise the responsibility they
should. The further delegation to the staff means that Congress is not
being accountable to the public and thus is sidestepping the reason
that the Framers vested in the legislative branch the principal obliga-
tion to formulate the broad fiscal policy society.
Consider, for example, the original issue discount rules, substan-
tially amended in 1984 to take into account a greater understanding
of the time value of money.3 9 Notwithstanding the complexity of this
area, which requires a relatively complex set of solutions, it seems
likely that few members of the tax-writing committees, and even
fewer members of Congress not on those committees, had any real
grasp of the solutions they adopted. Yet the principles of the eco-
nomic accrual of interest are not particularly difficult to describe, sug-
gesting that the basic legislative goals might have been accomplished
more simply so that they could have been better understood by the
members.
Other examples come readily to mind. The branch profits tax of
section 884 of the Internal Revenue Code,4° for instance, deals with
the former disparity in treatment between United States corporations
owned by foreign persons and doing business in the United States
directly, and foreign corporations owned by foreign persons doing
business in the United States through subsidiaries. 41 Again, it is diffi-
cult to imagine that many members of Congress understood the impli-
cations of this tax beyond its barest concept.42 Consider also the
passive activity loss rules of section 4694' and the deemed asset sale
rules of section 338," which are excessively wordy, contain needless
39. I.R.C. §§ 1271-88 (1988) see also Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369,
§ 41(a), 98 Stat. 678.
40. I.R.C. § 884 (1990).
41. I.R.C. § 884, enacted by section 1241(a) of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No.
99-514, 100 Stat. 2085.
42. Section 884 contains completely new terminology. For instance, "dividend equivalent
amount," I.R.C. § 884(a)-(b) uses instead of familiar terms "effectively connected earnings and
profits, adjusted as provided in subsection (b)" would have done just as well. In addition, it is
needlessly specific with respect to the required adjustments for investment by a foreign branch
in the United States. There is little reason to believe that non-lawyers understand what this is
all about, when the eyes of noted tax experts glaze when reading it.
43. I.R.C. § 469 (1990) (enacted as the Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514,
§ 501, 100 Stat. 2085). For discussion of these provisions, see Bankman, The Case Against
Passive Investment: A Critical Appraisal of the Passive Loss Restrictions, 42 STANFORD L. REV.
15 (1989); Peroni, A Policy Critique of the Section 469 Passive Loss Rules, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 1
(1988); and Zelenak, When Good Preferences Go Bad: A Critical Analysis of the Anti-Tax
Shelter Provisions of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, 67 TEX. L. REV. 499 (1988).
44. I.R.C. § 338 (1990) (enacted as the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982
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new language, and attempt to refine concepts that can easily be under-
stood only if they are left unrefined. Although these are random
examples, they are by no means isolated, and others may think of
different targets of criticism.
Contrast these complicated provisions with subsections (b) and
(c) of section 704.45 In each case the statutory concept is a simple
one, leaving it to regulatory interpretation to flesh out the details.46
However, the brief statutory language was thought adequate to give
the desired specificity to the statutory scheme without Congress
(TEFRA), Pub. L. No. 97-248, § 22(e)(4), 96 Stat. 324 (1982). For a discussion of section 338
and citation to some of the many articles that have been written concerning its effect, see B.
BITTKER & J. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND
SHAREHOLDERS § 11.47-11.48 (5th ed. 1987).
45. I.R.C. § 704(b) (1990). Section 704(b) reads as follows:
A partner's distributive share of income, gain, loss, deduction, or credit (or item
thereof) shall be determined in accordance with the partner's interest in the
partnership (determined by taking into account all the facts and circumstances),
if-
(1) the partnership agreement does not provide as to the partner's
distibutive share of income, gain, loss, deduction, or credit (or item thereof), or
(2) the allocation to a partner under the agreement of income, gain, loss,
deduction, or credit (or item thereof) does not have substantial economic effect.
Section 704(c), prior to the complications made by section 7642 of the Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1989, read as follows:
Under regulations prescribed by the Secretary, income, gain, loss, and
deduction with respect to property contributed to the partnership by a partner
shall be shared among the partners so as to take account of the variation between
the basis of the property to the partnership and its fair market value at the time
of contribution. Under regulations prescribed by the Secretary, rules similar to
the rules of the preceding sentence shall apply to contributions by a partner
(using the cash receipts and disbursements method of accounting) of accounts
payable and other accrued but unpaid items.
Rubin and Strauss refer to this sort of legislation as "intransitive." See Rubin, supra note 33;
Strauss, Legislative Theory, supra note 32, at 428.
Many administrative law scholars are not particularly disturbed by the overwhelming
complexity of the Internal Revenue Code. See, e.g., Jaffe, The Illusion of the Ideal Administra-
tion, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1183, 1188 (1973); Stewart, The Reformation ofAmerican Administra-
tive Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1667, 1695 n.127 (1975). Perhaps they view this issue with more
equanimity because they don't practice tax law.
46. The regulations under section 704(b) have gone through a couple of metamorphoses
and are extraordinarily long. See Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1 (1991); Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-iT
(1991); see also W. MCKEE, W. NELSON & R. WHITMIRE, FEDERAL TAXATION OF
PARTNERSHIPS AND PARTNERS § 10.01A (1977 & Cum. Supp. 1989); A. WILLIS, J. PENNELL
& P. POSTLEWAITE, PARTNERSHIP TAXATION chs. 101-107 (4th ed. 1989). The section
704(c) regulations are briefer and less controversial. For a discussion of section 704(c) and the
major change made in the statute in 1984, see W. MCKEE, W. NELSON & R. WHITMIRE,
supra, at § 10.08; and A. WILLIS, J. PENNELL & P. POSTLEWAITE, supra, at ch. 108.
Section 704(c) was further amended in 1989. Omnibus Budget Reconcilaition Act of
1989, Pub. L. No. 101-239, § 7642, 103 Stat. 2106. The amendment was designed to correct
certain "abuses," and it has complicated a very simple provision of the Code.
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becoming involved with the administrative details. Other examples of
situations in which Congress has provided simple statutory rules
include section 1502, in which it delegated regulation-writing author-
ity with respect to affiliated groups of corporations filing consolidated
returns, 47 and section 385, setting out principles to distinguish
between corporate debt and equity. 48 These two instances are of par-
ticular interest because each represents a situation in which Congress
specifically recognized that it should not try to deal with the subject
matter in any detail primarily because of its complexity.49
It is apparently possible, therefore, for Congress to avoid writing
tax statutes that the members cannot understand. Both aspects of
47. Section 1502 reads in pertinent part as follows: "The Secretary shall issue such
regulations as he may deem necessary taxtion note, the regulations promulgated pursuant to
the grant of authority in Section 1502 "for practical purposes constitute the 'law' of
consolidated returns." See B. BiT-rKER & J. EUSTICE, supra note 42, at § 15.20. For a
discussion of the delegation in Section 1502, see Salem, Judicial Deference, Consolidated
Returns, and Loss Disallowance: Could LDR Survive a Court Challenge?, 43 TAX EXECUTIVE
167, 176 (1991).
48. I.R.C. § 385(a) authorizes the Secretary "to prescribe such regulations as may be
necessary or appropriate to determine whether an interest in a corporation is to be treated ...
as stock or indebtedness." Subsection (b) describes the factors that are to be taken into
account in making that distinction. See B. BrrTKER & J. EUSTICE, supra note 42, at § 4.02
(discussing Treasury's failed attempts to write adequate rules under this delegation of
authority); see also Manning, Hyperlexis and the Law of Conservation ofAmbiguity: Thoughts
on Section 385, 36 TAX L. 9 (1982) (criticizing the infeasible attempts by the Treasury to make
the regulations confront every possible problem).
In section 7208(a) of the 1989 legislation, Congress gave the Treasury additional
regulatory authority under section 385 (to treat interests in part as debt and in part as stock),
noting as well that "it is important that the Treasury Department provide guidance to
taxpayers on debt-equity issues in an expeditious manner." See H.R. REP. No. 257, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess., 1235 (1974). Clearly Treasury would be better able to do so if it were to write
simpler rules under section 385 than those it proposed during the 1980's.
49. With respect to section 385, see S. REP. No. 552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 137 (1969),
reprinted in 1969-3 C.B. 510-12. Commenting on the distinction between debt and equity, the
committee report noted that "It]he differing circumstances which characterize these situations
... would make it difficult for the committee to provide comprehensive and specific statutory
rules of universal and equal applicability." Id. at 138.
With respect to section 1502, see S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 120 (1954), which
stated as follows:
Under the House bill, the consolidated return regulations were inserted in the
statute. While your committee recognizes that those regulations have been
generally accepted, your committee believes that it is more appropriate to have
these detailed rules in the form of regulations rather than in the statute. In this
form they may be readily amended without necessary congressional action. This
is particularly desirable in view of the many revisions of the income tax laws in
this bill which must be reflected in those regulations.
It should be noted that the delegation in section 1502 was generally successful until recent
years, when the slowness of the regulatory process caused Congress to enact various specific
rules to deal with consolidated returns. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 1503(e) (1990) (enacted as the Tax
and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-203, § 10222, 101 Stat. 1330) (pro-
viding a special rule for determing investment basis adjustments).
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accountability, described above, would be increased if Congress were
to do so more often. The members of Congress would be able to
understand what they were voting on, and their constituents would be
able to determine whether they liked the members' votes. The impor-
tance of increased accountability in the American system of govern-
ment should not be ignored: it is the basis for vesting fiscal powers in
Congress. That means that Congress should strive harder to fulfill the
obligations of the role it has as representative of the people by enact-
ing legislation that is more readily understood. This would reduce the
massive complexity we have seen in tax statutes in the recent past.
The ramifications of this suggestion are clear-legislating in less
detail will result in the delegation of more authority to the Treasury
to write rules and regulations that flesh out the simple laws written by
Congress. It is therefore extremely important for Congress to ensure
that it maintains policymaking functions, delegating only the execu-
tion of its policies to the executive branch. The question of whether
such delegation seems consistent with the general principles embodied
in the separation of powers is explored later in this section.5"
The point made here is a fairly simple one, but it is by no means
trivial. If accountability is the principal reason for lodging the taxing
power in Congress, then Congress should be accountable to the public
for the tax legislation it writes. Presently, such accountability does
not exist because the tax laws written by Congress are too detailed
and complex for the members of Congress or their constituents to
understand.
B. Limiting the Role of the Executive Branch
A second way in which Congress may have violated a fundamen-
tal aspect of the separation of powers is that by writing excessively
detailed legislation it may have deprived the executive branch of its
proper role in the lawmaking process. In analyzing why this might
be, it is useful to examine separation of powers decisions and scholarly
discussions for their impact on the question of delegating greater leg-
islative power to the Treasury.
Much of the scholarly literature and many of the recent Supreme
Court decisions about the impact of the separation of powers on mod-
em government have focused on the independent commissions and
other government agencies operating within executive branch depart-
ments or as wholly separate entities.5 The Treasury, in contrast, is
50. See infra Subsection III.D.
5 1. For instance, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission is part of the Department of
Energy, see 42 U.S.C. § 7171 (1988), and the Food and Drug Administration is part of the the
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an executive branch department with a cabinet secretary at its head.
Although created by Congress, 2 it is subject to the direct control of
the President. In the context of the appointment and removal power,
it is only subject to the control of Congress for the advice and consent
of the Senate for high-level appointments.53 Recent Supreme Court
doctrine with respect to the exercise of legislative and judicial powers
by independent agencies is therefore only partially relevant in assess-
ing the appropriateness of the vesting of such powers in the Treasury
under the laws written by Congress.
4
The essential issue presented by this Section of the Article, that
Congress should delegate what is essentially non-policy detail to the
Treasury, is one of deciding how modem government should be
organized to cope most effectively with modern society while ensuring
that the rights of the people vis-i-vis the government are protected.
The distribution of governmental power among the three separate
branches in our system was not designed to achieve maximum effi-
ciency. The Framers thought that efficient governments could more
easily become tyrannical and oppressive than inefficient ones.5 Nev-
ertheless, the Framers did value a system that could get things done,
and they distributed the governmental powers accordingly. Further-
more, as history demonstrates, Congress devised a variety of innova-
tive solutions to respond to perceived needs for greater flexibility in
government. These solutions have withstood the test of time and,
often, constitutional challenge.56
In addition to requiring structural responses that enable govern-
ment to function more smoothly, the complexity of everyday life in
the modern age (particularly in financial and other business transac-
tions) has demanded complex laws to regulate those activities. The
tax laws are complex because of the nature of the transactions to
Department of Health and Human Services, see 21 U.S.C. 393 (1988). In comparison, the
Securities and Exchange Commission and the Federal Trade Commission are independent
agencies. See 15 U.S.C. § 78(d) (1988) (SEC); 15 U.S.C. § 41 (1988) (FTC).
52. See Act of Sept. 2, 1789, ch. XII, § 1, 1 Stat. 65-6 (1789).
53. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
54. For an overview of recent law and scholarship regarding the role of agencies in the
administrative state, see Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers
and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573 (1984).
55. See THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 261 (J. Madison) (G. Wills ed. 1982); D. EPSTEIN,
supra note 32; L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 2-2, at 19-20 (2d ed. 1988).
56. See, e.g., Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 384-412 (1989) (upholding creation
of the sentencing commission); Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 608-11
(1935) (upholding restrictions on the President's right to fire members of the FTC). But see
Metropolitan Washington Airports Auth. v. Citizens for the Abatement of Aircraft Noise, Ill
S. Ct. 2298 (1991) (striking down an elaborate mechanism for the transfer and retention of
control over Washington, D.C. area airports).
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which they pertain. Perhaps those laws do not need to be as compli-
cated as they currently are, but a certain amount of complexity is
inevitable." Given that reality, the question becomes who should
have primary responsibility for providing the details: should Con-
gress retain that responsibility, delegating, as it must, the actual devel-
opment of the rules to its own staff, or should Congress delegate that
responsibility to the staff of the Treasury?5"
The answer suggested here is that Congress should strive to write
57. There is, however, a general consensus that the Internal Revenue Code today has more
than a little too much. Criticism of the complexity of the Code and the regulations
promulgated it focuses to some degree on the perceived need to address all possible
contingencies and to draft in order to prevent avenues for abuse. Carv Ferguson, a former
Assistant Attorney General of the Tax Division expressed his views on this issue: "The
Internal Revenue Code has become so highly articulated in frequent response to perceived
needs that copious and interpretative regulations have become essential to its administration."
See Ferguson, Development and Implementation of Tax Policy in the United States and the
United Kingdom: A Seminar of the American College of Tax Counsel, 4 AM. J. TAX POL'Y
107, 151 (1985).
Where statutes are not complex, regulations frequently are, a situation which the Code
seems to invite. Section 7805(a) of the Code grants general authority to the Secretary of the
Treasury to "prescribe all needful rules and regulations" for the enforcement of the internal
revenue laws. I.R.C. § 7805(a) (1990). In addition, there are numerous specific grants of
authority found in the Code itself and in its various amendments. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 338, 382,
704(c), 502 (1990)). Frederic Hickman, a former Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Tax
Policy has compared the overly specific regulations promulgated by Treasury to the work of
inexperienced attorneys attempting to draft documents to cover every contingency "except the
one that actually occurs." Invitational Conference on the Reduction of Income Tax
Complexity, (Jan. 11, 1990). For a report of this conference, see Sheppard, Simplification
Means Tough Choices, AICPA/ABA Conferees Agree, 46 TAX NOTES 381 (1990). Many
perceive, and the Internal Revenue Service and the Treasury Department have recently
recognized, that the way out of the current morass may well be to develop bright line tests and
safe harbors in order to avoid some of the greatest burdens of complexity. This will allay some
of the excessive concern about tax avoidance that has animated much of the regulatory process
in the recent past. See id. at 382-83. For a general discussion of the burdens of complexity in
the tax law as viewed by a prominent practitioner, see Henderson, Controlling Hyperlexis-
The Most Important "Law And ... ," Tax Forum Paper #452 (1989) (on file with the author).
58. In the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Tax Policy, two branches
are specifically concerned with taxation: the Office of Tax Legislative Counsel (TLC),
composed principally of lawyers; and the Office of Tax Analysis (OTA), composed principally
of economists. As the name implies, the duties of the lawyers are related principally to the
legislative effort. See McDaniel, Political Process, supra note 7, at 32-36. Nevertheless, the
staff of TLC have specific regulations projects as well and work on them together with their
counterparts at the IRS Chief Counsel's Office. The Assistant Secretary of the Treasury and
the Commissioner of Internal Revenue must sign all Treasury Regulations promulgated in the
Federal Register.
The duties and functions of the IRS are described in detail in B. BITIKER, supra note 7, at
§ 110.1. The IRS makes clear in its Statement of Principles that its job is to "administer" the
Code. See Rev. Proc. 64-22, 1964-1 C.B. 689; Statement of Organization and Functions, 1974-
1 C. B. 440. See generally M. SALTZMAN, IRS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE (1981) (describing
the duties of the IRS and how it carries them out). The Saltzman treatise discusses the
interrelationship of the Treasury and the IRS and how they administer the Internal Revenue
Code. Id. at § 1.0211].
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simpler tax laws and should delegate the management of administra-
tive detail to the Treasury. This view is based not only on the belief
that such a system would be more accountable and more efficient,
59
but also on the Constitution's suggestions about the appropriate inter-
action of the three branches in our tri-partite system. The fundamen-
tal principles of the separation of powers give the executive branch an
important and dynamic role in the tax lawmaking process. Congress
unduly limits this role when it writes extremely detailed laws. Consti-
tutional history as well as the Framers' conception of the basic struc-
ture of the government support the theory that Congress should
delegate the management of detail to the executive branch. Recent
Supreme Court decisions about the separation of powers, particularly
INS v. Chadha,6° Bowsher v. Synar,6' and Morrison v. Olson, also sup-
port this theory.62
1. CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY AND THE STRUCTURE OF
AMERICAN GOVERNMENT
When the Framers considered how to organize the structure of
American government, they were careful to discard the models that
were otherwise acceptable but might inadequately guard against tyr-
anny. They gave the President the power to propose legislation,6a but
they gave the legislative power to Congress.' They assigned to the
President the task "to take Care that the Laws be faithfully exe-
cuted. ' ' 65 They did not, however, specify exactly how that was to be
done, or the relationship between legislation and execution.
The few references to executive departments found in Article 1166
indicate that the Framers contemplated that the President would have
executive officers to carry out the day-to-day business of executing
59. But see Frug, The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1277,
1318-34 (1984) (criticizing the American tendency to rely on agencies to develop law under the
erroneous assumption that they are more efficient than Congress).
60. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
61. 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
62. 487 U.S. 645 (1988). The Court's latest separation-of-powers decision suggests that
the failure to delegate executive functions to the executive branch may render a statute
unconstitutional. Metropolitan Washington Airports Auth. v. Citizens for the Abatement of
Aircraft Noise, Ill S. Ct. 2298 (1991) (holding that a scheme, granting state agencies certain
powers subject to examination by a Board of Review comprised of members of Congress, was
unconstitutional under the iseparation of powers principle).
63. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
64. Id. art. I, § 1. Cf Youngstown Sheet & Tube v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587 (1952)
("The Constitution limits [the President's] functions in the lawmaking process to the
recommending of laws he thinks wise and the vetoing of laws he thinks bad.").
65. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
66. Id. art. II, §§ 2, 4.
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laws written by Congress.67 Indeed, the Constitution specifically pro-
vides for congressional control over the appointments process for the
heads of the executive departments by requiring Senate confirmation
of the President's appointees. 68 But the Constitution does not detail
how the actual governance is to be carried out once Congress has
written those laws that the President is required to execute faithfully.
Various inferences can be drawn from this failure to more care-
fully delineate the exact relationships between the Congress and the
executive branch officers below the President. The most plausible of
these is that the Framers did not know exactly what would happen,
but they were confident that they had set up a system in which none
of the three branches of government would be so powerful as to con-
trol the others. Having experienced the British parliamentary sys-
tem 69 and having read the democratic theories of Locke7" and
Montesquieu,71 they clearly expected that there would be a number of
governmental departments that would carry out the day-to-day func-
tions of government. Presumably the Framers concluded that estab-
lishing precise details was best left to the future so they did not name
the departments 72 or describe their exact relationship to Congress.
The Framers did want to ensure that the President, with a lim-
ited role in the actual legislative process but an important role as the
head of the branch that would carry out the legislative dictates, would
not be able to arrogate greater than appropriate power as a result of
his executive duties.73 Thus, the Framers' failure to describe the vari-
ous departments meant that they wanted Congress to create them as
it saw fit, under the authority granted to it by the "necessary and
proper" clause.74 In addition, the Framers lodged in Congress the
appropriations power, so that no money could be spent for govern-
ance without congressional legislation. 75 As a result, the Framers
67. See Strauss, supra note 54, at 605-08.
68. U.S. CONST. art. 11, § 2.
69. See generally THE FEDERALIST Nos. 67 & 69 (A. Hamilton) (G. Wills ed. 1982)
(discussing the despotic power of the King of England).
70. See generally J. LOCKE, Two TREATISES ON GOVERNMENT (Cambridge Univ. Press
1960).
71. See C. MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF LAWS (M. Nugent trans. 1873). For a
discussion of Montesquieu's theories, see H. MERRY, MONTESQUIEU'S SYSTEM OF NATURAL
GOVERNMENT (1970).
72. Proposals, such as that by Gouvernour Morris, to name the departments in the
Constitution were rejected by the Constitutional Convention. See Strauss, supra note 54, at
600-01.
73. See THE FEDERALIST Nos. 67 & 69 (A. Hamilton).
74. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
75. For a discussion of the appropriations power, see L. TRIBE, supra note 53, at 256-57,
321; Stith, Congress' Power of the Purse, 97 YALE L.J. 1343 (1988).
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gave Congress considerable ability to curtail potential executive des-
potism, and they vested the Supreme Court with responsibility to
mediate the disputes that inevitably would arise between the political
branches over who was permitted to exercise which powers.76 This
distribution of authority among the branches was certainly designed
to keep the executive branch in check.
On the other hand, it is clear from the framework of the Consti-
tution that the Framers were also suspicious of a governmental struc-
ture in which the legislature was too dominant. They feared
legislative control of the executive as much as they feared executive
control of legislation." In addition, they assumed from experience
under the Articles of Confederation that the Congress could not gov-
ern well on its own because of the nature of legislation and its incre-
mental and ad hoc response to problems. 78 Thus, the Constitution
only provided Congress a limited role in the actual operations of gov-
ernment. The legislative occupation of a member of Congress was, in
the early days of the nation, quite limited. Congress was to be in
session only one month of every year, 79 thereby permitting the mem-
bers to engage in their regular occupations (farmer, shopkeeper, law-
yer, for example) throughout the remainder of the year. This
preserved for Congress a lawmaking power severely circumscribed by
time, with no role whatsoever in the administration of the few laws it
might enact during the short legislative sessions. Only the President
and his subordinate officers were to occupy full-time positions in the
business of government.
As it turned out, Congress wasted no time creating departments
within the executive branch, and, from the standpoint of the inquiry
addressed here, it is interesting to note that one of the first depart-
ments it established during its first session was the Treasury Depart-
ment. Administration of the nascent government's funds was
regarded as an extremely important executive function. It is also
important, from the standpoint of the distributed powers, that Con-
gress took pains to ensure that the Secretary of the Treasury would be
answerable to it as well as to the Chief Executive:
[I]t shall be the duty of the Secretary of the Treasury... to make'
report and give information to either branch of the legislature, in
person or in writing (as he may be required), respecting all matters
76. U.S. CONST. art. III. For a general discussion of the judicial power, see L. TRIBE,
supra note 53, at 96-107.
77. See THE FEDERALIST No. 48 (J. Madison); D. EPSTEIN, supra note 31, at 128.
78. See D. EPSTEIN, supra note 32, at 131-33; Strauss, Separation of Powers, supra note 52,
at 603.
79. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 2.
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referred to him by the Senate or House of Representatives, or
which shall pertain to his office.8°
Congress wanted to make clear to the subordinate officers of the exec-
utive branch from the very start that its power extended beyond that
of consent to appointment into the realm of overseeing the ways these
officers carried out their duties of governance.81
The governmental structure established by the Constitution is
quite rational, given the overwhelming belief of the Framers that dis-
tributing power among the branches would best guard against tyr-
anny. The system permits Congress to enact legislation and to
delegate broad authority to the executive branch to carry out the leg-
80. Act of Sept. 2, 1789, ch. 12, § 2, 1 Stat. 65-66.
81. It was not until the middle of the twentieth century that Congress adopted a set of
rules about oversight. The Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 formalized the oversight
function of Congress, which had previously been carried on in a piecemeal fashion. See Act of
Aug. 2, 1946, ch. 753, 60 Stat. 812. Various types of congressional investigations prior to that
time included those involved with wars (the Indian wars and the Civil War) and financial and
political scandals (Credit Mobilier and Teapot Dome). See W. OLESZEK, CONGRESSIONAL
PROCEDURES AND THE POLICY PROCESS 202 (1978). The ratifying conventions for the
Constitution recognized the general investigative powers of Congress, referring to their general
historical antecedents in the English Grand Inquest of the Nation. See Berger, Congressional
Subpoenas to Executive Officials, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 865 (1975). Oversight activities were
one subject of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970, which called them "review"
functions and which provided more rules regarding the surveillance power of the legislative
branch over the executive. See Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-510, 84
Stat. 1140.
Five years later, when Congress made several rules changes that resulted in a more open
legislative process, it also formally adopted rules for the creation of oversight subcommittees
for the various committees of Congress. See H.R. Res. 998, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974); S. Res.
55, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). For a contemporaneous view of the oversight responsibility,
see M. OGUL, CONGRESS OVERSEES THE BUREAUCRACY (1976). Prior to 1974, the
subcommittees of the Ways and Means Committee did not include a subcommitee with specific
oversight responsibilities. Oversight occurred only rarely, and not through the formal hearing
process. During the past fifteen years, however, the oversight function of the Ways and Means
Committee has become increasingly important. For a general discussion of the uses and
abuses of the oversight power, see Parnell, Congressional Interference in Agency Enforcement:
The IRS Experience, 89 YALE L.J. 1360 (1980). Parnell found that the Senate Finance
Oversight Subcommittee rarely met and seldom conducted hearings. Id. at 1367. The merger
of the Oversight Subcommittee with the Subcommittee on Private Retirement Plans in the
reorganization of the Finance Committee that took place in the 100th Congress indicates that
the tendency for it to do little continues.
Oversight of the executive branch occurs not only through the formal committee hearing
process but also through the investigation and reporting functions of the General Accounting
Office ("GAO"). See 31 U.S.C. § 3526 (1983). Specifically with reference to taxation, the
GAO makes recommendations as to how the IRS could better perform some of its functions.
See, e.g., U.S. COMPTROLLER GENERAL, REPORT TO CONGRESS, IRS CAN IMPROVE ITS
PROCESS FOR DECIDING WHICH CORPORATE RETURNS TO AUDIT (Aug. 3, 1979), cited in B.
BITTKER, supra note 7, at § 116.9 n. 15. Some GAO reports are made specifically at the behest
of one of the oversight subcommittees of Congress. See, e.g., U.S. COMPTROLLER GENERAL,
REPORT TO CONGRESS, TAX ADMINISTRATION: IRS' AUTOMATED COLLECTION SYSTEM
(July 1986).
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islative purposes. 2 But in preserving certain powers for Congress, it
permits Congress to oversee the executive branch activities so that it
can prevent unwarranted interpretations by executive branch officers
of the laws Congress enacts. It also permits the Congress to control
the actions of the executive branch departments by controlling their
appropriations. Yet the Constitution does not appear to give Con-
gress an actual say in the detailed administration of the laws it writes.
That function is given to the President and the employees of the exec-
utive branch, who must carry out their duties under the constitutional
admonition of faithful execution. 3 Without the executive depart-
ment's active role in the process of governing, the erratic and incre-
mental legislative pattern would have led to chaos.
Looking at the recent past and the legislative morass that has
developed in the tax area, it seems that we are in the precise state the
Framers sought to avoid. Congress has in many situations seized con-
trol of the detail of the tax laws. This tendency has made the laws
themselves hypertechnical and hence susceptible to frequent change,
rendering them almost unadministrable. 84 If Congress wrote simpler
laws, the proper role of Treasury in the governmental process would
be better preserved. The management of detail would be entrusted to
the executive branch, where it properly belongs. In that way, the
structure adopted by the Framers would be respected and its purpose
of guarding against tyranny would be effectuated.
2. SUPREME COURT DECISIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE
SEPARATION OF POWERS
Against the historical background described, it is hardly surpris-
ing that the Supreme Court has been called upon from time to time to
resolve disputes over the exercise of the distributed powers by one of
the two political branches. The inevitability of such disputes is attrib-
82. See infra Subsection III.D for a discussion of the propriety of legislative delegations.
83. The constitutional admonition of "faithful execution" applies directly to the President.
See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. But it is implicit in that charge that the inferior officers whom he
or she hires must also follow the dictates of the Constitution. See, e.g., Myers v. United States,
272 U.S. 52, 122 (1926). For a discussion of various presidential controls over agency actions,
see Bruff, Presidential Management of Agency Rulemaking, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 535
(1989).
84. The frequency with which Congress has enacted complex tax legislation in the period
since the Tax Reform Act of 1976 has led to a considerable regulations backlog. Contributing
to that backlog is the complexity of some of the statutory provisions that were enacted in
recent years. The difficulty of issuing regulations under complex statutory schemes is
exemplified by the recent experience with section 469, where the Treasury used 100 pages to
define one statutory term-the word "activity." The ABA Tax Section sharply criticized this
effort. See ABA Tax Section, Task Force on Passive Losses, Preamble to the Comments on
Activity Regs, 44 TAX NOTES 1277 (1989).
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utable to the Constitution's failure to spell out exactly the relation-
ships that the two branches should have. In addition, interbranch
jealousy and desire for control of outcomes has frequently led to
attempts by Congress to impose controls on the executive branch.
Such extra-legislative mechanisms for control as limitations on the
presidential removal power and the legislative veto have been the sub-
ject of considerable dispute among scholars85 and in the courts.86
These mechanisms have also led to a meaning of the separation of
powers doctrine in a government that is different from the one envi-
sioned by the Framers of the Constitution, who could scarcely have
foreseen the numerous agencies and commissions that make up the
modern administrative state.8 7
A review of the removal power cases, including both those that
concern independent agencies and those that concern executive
departments, leads to the conclusion that the cases are not important
for their largely unsuccessful formalistic attempts to define legislative,
executive, or judicial powers or actions. They are important rather
for their recognition of the primacy in the American form of govern-
ment of the diffusion of power among the branches and the operation
of the checks and balances thereby created.88 The decision in INS v.
Chadha,a9 the legislative veto case, reveals the significance of the sepa-
ration of powers doctrine at the present time. Both the removal cases
and Chadha support the theory that Congress should write fairly sim-
ple tax statutes and delegate the function of filling in the detail to the
Treasury where necessary.
85. See, e.g., Bruff & Gellhorn, Congressional Control of Administrative Regulation: A
Study of Legislative Vetoes, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1369 (1977); Cooper & Cooper, The Legislative
Veto and the Constitution, 30 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 467 (1962); Ginnane, The Control of
Federal Administration by Congressional Resolutions and Committees, 66 HARV. L. REV. 569
(1953); Javits & Klein, Congressional Oversight and the Legislative Veto: A Constitutional
Analysis, 52 N.Y.U. L. REV. 455 (1977). Post-Chadha articles include Breyer, The Legislative
Veto after Chadha, 72 GEO. L.J. 785 (1984); Strauss, Was There a Baby in the Bathwater? A
Comment on the Supreme Court's Legislative Veto Decision, 1983 DUKE L.J. 789; see also J.
SUNDQUIST, CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM AND EFFECTIVE GOVERNMENT 116-32 (1986).
86. With respect to the legislative veto, see INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983); with
respect to the removal power, see Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935),
and Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
87. Strauss, supra note 52, at 605-08.
88. Id. at 609-16. Strauss makes the point quite well: "[Tiheir conclusions can also be
understood in light of the checks-and-balances approach, and so understood the opinions are
both readily reconciled and consistent with the constitutional scheme." Id. at 609.
89. 462 U.S. 919 (1983). Chadha clearly relied on the same idea: the Constitution
established a scheme dividing powers among the branches in order to make the government
less susceptible to accompanying tyrannical impulses. See infra text notes 11 6-29 (discussing
Chadha).
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a. The Removal Cases
At the heart of the removal power cases is the question of control
over the actions of the person who may be removed. Accordingly, the
issue of what functions the person performs is relevant to the out-
come.90 If the person, as an employee of an agency, may exercise
legislative or judicial powers (as the heads of independent commis-
sions are permitted to do), the person is more properly subject to con-
trol by Congress, or less properly subject to unfettered control by the
President, because the right to exercise such legislative or judicial
functions necessarily derives from Congress and is delegated by it to
the agency in the agency's enabling legislation.9
In Myers v. United States,92 the first of the modem removal cases,
the Supreme Court considered whether the President could remove a
postmaster before the completion of his statutory four-year term with-
out the consent of the Senate. 93 A divided Court said that presidential
removal was proper, holding that the reservation of the requirement
of Senate consent to the removal improperly invaded the power of the
President as Chief Executive.94 Meyers thus accepted the inherent
and unfettered power of the President over the officers employed in
the executive branch. As a result the President has authority to direct
the actions of those officers, free from intervention by the legislative
branch.95
Less than ten years later, the Court confronted the legislative
control question with respect to an employee of an independent
agency. In Humphrey's Executor v. United States,96 the Court found
that Congress properly required dismissal of a member of the Federal
Trade Commission by the President be for cause.97 It thus retreated
somewhat from its earlier holding in Myers, but only in the context of
90. In Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926), the Court considered the powers of a
postmaster to be executive in nature. In Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602
(1935), the Court regarded the powers of an F.T.C. Commissioner as legislative and judicial in
nature. In both Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 726 (1986) (Comptroller General), and
Morrison v. Olson, 108 S. Ct. 2597, 2616-18 (1988) (special prosecutor), the powers were
regarded as executive.
91. The fact that Congress itself exercises the legislative power gives it the authority to
delegate that power to executive branch and fourth branch agencies. See Strauss, supra note
52, at 605. Congress also presumably has the power to delegate judicial authority under its
general power to establish lower federal courts. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v.
Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986); Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932); U.S. CONsT. art. III.
92. 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
93. Act of July 12, 1876, 19 Stat. 80, c. 179.
94. Myers, 272 U.S. at 121-23.
95. Id. at 122.
96. 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
97. The Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914. ch. 311, 38 Stat. 717.
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a "fourth branch" administrative agency which could exercise only
"quasi-legislative" and "quasi-judicial" powers. 9 Taken by them-
selves, these two cases suggest a fundamental difference between exec-
utive branch employees and employees of independent agencies, with
Congress having more power over the latter because it can restrict the
circumstances in which the President may remove them.
The distinction drawn in Humphrey's Executor between execu-
tive employees and employees of independent agencies has been
largely discounted in recent years by the recognition that executive
branch officers do in fact exercise functions that are essentially legisla-
tive and judicial.99 This has not resulted in their being viewed as any
less "executive" than they were originally. The distinction in
Humphrey's Executor arises from the recognition that the checks and
balances imposed by the Constitution require rigorous attention when
Congress tries to exert undue power over actions by subordinate
officers in the executive branch.
There is also a rational basis for distinguishing between executive
branch agencies on the one hand and independent agencies on the
other. The functions of the independent agencies derive entirely from
Congress, which on its own initiative created them and assigned their
functions, not as departments within the executive branch, but as
something separate. Thus, Congress arguably should be able to main-
tain more control over independent agencies than it has over the exec-
utive departments. The functions of the executive branch
departments, unlike those of the independent agencies, do not derive
solely from Congress but jointly from Congress and the Constitution
itself. Although Congress created them, the Constitution recognized
that such departments must exist to allow the President to carry out
the mandated execution of the laws.
Implicit in Myers is the belief that employees of the executive
branch always perform executive functions1°° and thus are subject to
control with respect to job tenure only by their superiors in that
branch.101 Both Myers and Humphrey's Executor suggest that execu-
98. Humphrey's Executer, 295 U.S. at 629; see also Strauss, supra note 52, at 612.
99. See Strauss, supra note 52, at 611-12.
100. The ability of executive branch officers has become readily accepted to legislate as well
as to adjudicate. The Administrative Procedure Act applies to both executive branch agencies
and to those that are independent. See Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-
706 (1989). The Act sets out standards rules for promulgating and adjudicating disputes. The
IRS, for example, participates in the rulemaking process along with the Treasury, see B.
BITTKER, supra note 7, at § 110.4, and also adjudicates disputes between it and taxpayers, see
id. at § 112.1.
101. Not permitting the Senate to impose a consent condition on the firing of executive
branch officers makes those officers subject to the control only of the President and those below
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tive departments are intended by the Constitution to be fully
independent in the exercise of their executive functions and are sub-
ject to legislative control only through proper legislative activities:
oversight and the appropriations power. Although the Humphrey's
Executor court felt that distinctions should be drawn between execu-
tive departments and independent agencies in these respects, that is
not especially relevant to the inquiry here, and the formalistic distinc-
tions it makes are outmoded. 102
The stress in the early cases on what constitutes an executive
power, as opposed to a legislative or a judicial power, has been largely
rejected in the more recent removal cases. These cases support the
view that the importance of removal power lies in the emphasis on the
constitutional scheme of diffused powers and checks and balances. In
Bowsher v. Synar,10 3 the Supreme Court considered whether the
Comptroller General, who was appointed by the President but could
be removed only by joint resolution of Congress or by impeachment,
could exercise certain powers under the Balanced Budget Emergency
Deficit Control Act of 1985.104 Under that law as originally enacted,
the Comptroller General had to determine the amounts of reductions
in the federal budget deficit that were to be applied in the event that
Congress did not need the deficit reduction targets of the legislation in
the budget it adopted."15 The President was then to issue a sequestra-
tion order containing the budget reductions specified by the Comp-
troller General's report.
10 6
Accepting the opinion of the lower court that such actions by the
Comptroller General constituted an exercise of executive power,,0 7
the Supreme Court held that the Congress is not entitled "to reserve
for itself the power of removal of an officer charged with the execution
of the laws except by impeachment."'' 0 In other words, Congress
cannot give a person who is at least in part its employee' 0 9 the power
him to whom he or she has delegated that power. Congress may, of course, have considerable
influence over whether an executive branch employee is retained in office, as the experience of
Ann Gorsuch and the Environmental Protection Agency demonstrates. See Note, The
Conflict Between Executive Privilege and Congressional Oversight: The Gorsuch Controversy,
1983 DUKE L.J. 1333.
102. See Strauss, supra note 52, at 611-12.
103. 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
104. The Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-177,
Tit. II, 99 Stat. 1037.
105. Id. at § 251(b).
106. Id. at § 252.
107. Synar v. United States, 626 F. Supp. 1374, 1403 (D.D.C. 1986).
108. Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 726.
109. The conclusion that the Comptroller General is an employee of the Congress was
made after review of congressional testimony and of various statutes. See id. at 726-32.
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to exercise the functions that the Constitution mandates the executive
branch to perform. Although the opinion to some extent relies on
differentiating between executive and legislative functions,o that for-
malist distinction is not necessary to the decision in the case. The real
importance of Bowsher lies in the determination that the proper func-
tioning of the government requires that any legislative scheme estab-
lished by Congress must respect the division of power among the
branches. Thus, the principal holding of Bowsher is that the Constitu-
tion requires Congress to delegate the execution of the laws rather
than retaining execution for itself.1 II
The most recent removal case, Morrison v. Olson,2 also demon-
strates the movement away from formalism. It involved restrictions
on the Attorney General's power to remove an independent prosecu-
tor from office after being appointed in accordance with the scheme
Congress established for such executive branch employees. In Morri-
son, the Court retreated somewhat from the rationale in Humphrey's
Executor.II3 This permitted the Court to analyze the restriction that
removal of a special prosecutor be for "good cause" in a more flexible
manner that accords with current scholarly views about the separa-
tion of powers." 4
In its decision in Morrison, the Court noted that "the real ques-
tion is whether the removal restrictions are of such nature that they
impede the President's ability to perform his constitutional duty
.... ,,""5 It concluded that the statutory scheme for appointment and
removal of special prosecutors withstood constitutional scrutiny,
which suggests that the Court currently views the removal cases as
bearing on the way government as a whole functions, with the powers
properly distributed among its branches. In moving away from for-
110. Id. at 732-34.
111. This view is supported by dicta in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 119 (1976) (per
curiam) ("[T]he Legislative Branch may not exercise executive authority by retaining the
power to appoint those who will execute its laws."), and Springer v. Philippine Islands, 277
U.S. 189, 202 (1928) ("[T]he legislature cannot engraft executive duties upon a legislative
office, since that would be to usurp the power of appointment by indirection .... ); see also
Rubin, supra note 9, at 390.
Another view, expressed by Justice Stevens in his concurrence in Bowsher, considers the
power in question as legislative and holds that Congress may not delegate legislative power to
one of its agents, even if it may delegate that power to independent and executive branch
agencies. See Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 753-59 (Stevens, J., concurring). Although this view was
not adopted by the majority in Bowsher, it has resurfaced, in somewhat altered form, in
Metropolitan Washington Airports Auth. v. Citizens for the Abatement of Aircraft Noise, 111
S. Ct. 2298 (1991). See infra Part III.B.2.c.
112. 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
113. Id. at 685-91.
114. Id. at 691-93.
115. Id. at 691.
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malism toward a recognition that powers overlap within our system,
the Court has moved the separation of powers doctrine in the direc-
tion this Article suggests. The removal power cases, particularly the
most recent ones, are essentially about limiting the power of Congress
in order to permit the executive to exercise an important and
independent role in the government. Rather than finding formal
labels for actions that may be performed by either branch, the pri-
mary concern is to accord respect to a system of coordinated
independent branches.
Without addressing the question of which acts are inherently
executive in nature and which are not-a difficult enterprise at best
and one that is not terribly useful' 6-it is clear that the removal
power cases support the theory that some functions must be preserved
for the executive branch, subject only to oversight and other proper
legislative controls. The basis for this division of powers in our Con-
stitution comes from the Framer's acceptance of Montesquieu's belief
that permitting legislatures the power of execution would magnify the
possibility of government tyranny." 17 Thus, the Framers of the Con-
stitution preserved for the executive an important role in the govern-
ment, allowing the employees of that branch to interpret the laws
written by Congress and apply them to individual facts and circum-
stances. In enacting detailed tax laws that contain their own interpre-
tation and specific application and that are obviously written by its
staff, Congress tends to deprive the Treasury of its constitutional role
in government.
116. Courts that have tried to draw the distinction have not heeded the words of caution
from Mr. Justice Holmes, dissenting in Springer v. Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189, 211
(1928):
It does not seem to need argument to show that however we may disguise it by
veiling words we do not and cannot carry out the distinction between legislative
and executive action with mathematical precision and divide the branches into
watertight compartments, were it ever so desirable to do so, which I am far from
believing that it is, or that the Constitution requires.
Cf. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 747 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring) ("One reason that the
exercise of legislative, executive, and judicial powers cannot be categorically distributed among
three mutually exclusive branches of Government is that governmental power cannot always
be readily characterized with only one of those three labels."); Metropolitan Washington Air-
ports Auth. v. Citizens for the Abatement of Aircraft Noise, 111 S. Ct. 2298, 2312 (1991)
(noting that the Court need not consider Congress's delegation to its Board of Review to be
"quintessentially executive" in order to find it unconstitutional).
117. "When the legislative and the executive powers are united in the same person, or in the
same body of magistrates, there can be no liberty; because apprehensions may arise, lest the
same monarch or senate should enact tyrannical laws, to execute them in a tyrannical
manner." C. MONTESQUIEU, supra note 69, at 174; see also H. MERRY, supra note 71, at 300.
CONGRESS AND TAXES
b. INS v. Chadha
The Supreme Court's decision in INS v. Chadha"8 supports the
conclusions just drawn from the removal power cases."1 9 Chadha,
like the removal cases, involved an attempt by the Congress to exert
power over the executive branch. Like many other statutes 120 in
which Congress had delegated specific powers to independent agen-
cies and executive departments, a provision of the Immigration and
Nationality Act had allowed either house of Congress, by resolution,
to invalidate a decision by the Attorney General to allow a particular
deportable alien to remain in the United States.' 2' In this case, the
Attorney General granted Chadha's application for suspension of
deportation and transmitted its recommendation to Congress. The
House then passed a resolution declaring that Chadha and five other
aliens would not be entitled to become permanent residents of the
United States. 22 Chadha sued to prevent his deportation, and ulti-
mately the Supreme Court invalidated the legislative veto altogether.
A legislative veto like the one struck down in Chadha had been
the subject of scholarly concern for many years. Views favoring 123
and opposing 2 4 the use by Congress of such extra-legislative controls
over the executive had been recorded from the time Congress first
enacted such a provision in 1932.125 The decision in Chadha is signifi-
cant because it lays to rest many of the arguments, based on expedi-
ency, in favor of permitting the legislative branch to exert greater
control over the executive branch by avoiding bicameral considera-
tion of a law then subject to veto by the President.
In deciding Chadha, the Supreme Court emphasized the impor-
tance in our constitutional system of the way the branches are
intended to work together in the legislative process. Stressing the
need for bicameralism, the Court noted that the Framers wanted to
ensure that legislation would be enacted only after it had been "care-
118. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
119. See supra text accompanying notes 90-115.
120. Justice White noted in dissent that the Court's decision in Chadha essentially struck
down legislative veto provisions in "nearly 200" other statutes. Id. at 967 (White, J.,
dissenting).
121. Immigration and Nationality Act, § 244(c), Pub. L. No. 414, 66 Stat. 163, 216
(amended 1986).
122. See Chadha, 462 U.S. at 926. It was not clear to the Supeme Court that the House
really understood what it was doing. See id. at 927 n.3.
123. See, e.g., Cooper & Cooper, supra note 83.
124. See, e.g., Bruff & Gellhorn, Congressional Control of Administrative Regulation: A
Study of Legislative Vetoes, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1369 (1977).
125. Congress in that year permitted the reorganization of the executive branch, but it
made such reorganization subject to its review. See Act of June 30, 1932, § 497, 47 Stat. 414.
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fully and fully considered by the Nation's elected officials." '126 No less
important to this scheme is the requirement of presentment, which
ensures that the President will have the opportunity to judge the
soundness of the legislation. 27 In stressing the importance of the
Constitution's structure of the legislative function, the decision in
Chadha recognizes the need for the distribution of powers exercised
only as the Constitution specifically prescribes.
In that sense, Chadha does not depart from the removal cases, a
fact recognized by both the district court'28 and Supreme Court'2 9
decisions. The issue is a basic one: whether Congress or the President
may control the actions of the employees of the executive branch.
The removal cases hold that Congress may not control those employ-
ees by removing them if it does not like what they do. Chadha says
that Congress may control the actions of executive branch employees
by telling them what to do, but only by enacting legislation in the way
the Constitution says that legislation must be enacted.
Chadha recognizes that Congress may try to control the execu-
tive branch in ways that are outside the contemplation of the constitu-
tional system. One of these ways, though not as obvious as a
legislative veto, is by writing extremely detailed laws. By writing such
laws, Congress indicates its distrust of and desire to limit administra-
tive decisionmaking. 130  As with the legislative veto exercised in
Chadha, Congress thereby seeks to limit what the executive branch
employees may do, substituting its judgment-or, more accurately,
that of its staff-for that of executive branch employees and not
allowing them the freedom that the Constitution confers on them to
interpret the laws. Chadha subtly suggests that congressional asser-
tion of such control over the executive is suspect because it does not
follow the structure the Framers intended.' 31 Respecting that struc-
ture is fundamental. Thus detailed legislation, whatever its merits,
126. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 949.
127. Id. at 947-48.
128. Synar v. United States, 626 F. Supp. 1374, 1402-03 (D.D.C. 1986).
129. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 726 (1986).
130. Cf. Comment, Congress Steps Out: A Look at Congressional Control of the Executive,
63 CALIF. L. REV. 983, 1055 (1975) ("Generally, the more broadly a statute is drawn, the
more power the President will have relative to Congress. Thus interbranch jealousy typically
prompts Congress to prepare specific and narrowly drawn legislation to limit the powers it
creates.").
131. It is true that if Chadha is read more narrowly to stand only for the proposition that
legislation must be enacted bicamerally and presented to the President, the sorts of statutes
that Congress enacts in the tax area clearly conform to those requirements. But the import of
Chadha is not so simple. In stressing the need for bicameralism and presentment in order for
legislation to be constitutionally valid, the Court also emphasized the reasons for those
constitutional requirements. Those reasons support the view that Congress must not retain for
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may inappropriately encroach on the roles the Constitution preserves
for the executive branch.
C. Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority v. Citizens for the
Abatement of Aircraft Noise
Metropolitan Washington Airports 32 uniquely illustrates some of
the separation of powers issues presented in the earlier cases. The
case represents a retreat to formalism after the Court's more function-
alist decisions in Morrison133 and Mistretta.134 Nevertheless, Metro-
politan Washington Airports does tend to support this Article's theory
that Congress should not delegate to its own agents the authority to
make essentially executive decisions. In fact, like Bowsher and
Chadha, Metropolitan Washington Airports focuses on the question of
how government should operate under the Constitution.
The Metropolitan Washington Airports case arose because Con-
gress attempted an innovative solution to the problem of administer-
ing the two Washington, D.C. area airports. The airports had
previously been administered by the Federal Aviation Administra-
tion, until the need to raise funds for capital improvements, particu-
larly at Washington National airport, 35 prompted many to suggest
that control over the airports should be given to a regional author-
ity. 36 This new regional authority would have the ability to raise
funds through the issuance of bonds. Congress, however, opposed the
complete transfer of control to the regional authority, and subse-
quently it imposed a condition to the lease of the land on which the
airports were located and established a Board of Review to oversee
the decisions of the regional authority.
1 31
itself the power to interpret the laws-it must delegate that to the co-equal branch charged
with that power. See generally Strauss, supra note 85.
132. Metropolitan Washington Airports Auth. v. Citizens for the Abatement of Aircraft
Noise, 111 S. Ct. 2298 (1991).
133. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
134. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
135. The intense controversy surrounding the intended improvements to Washington
National Airport brought this case to court. National's location "at the center of the
Metropolitan area is a great convenience for air travelers." Metropolitan Washington Airports,
111 S. Ct. at 2302. But citizens of the areas have objected long and strenuously to the noise,
the pollution, and the dangers associated with flight paths over such densely populated areas.
Id.
136. The members clearly believed that if the local citizenry had sole say in the matter,
there would be a significant decrease in the use of National and a shift of many flights to
Dulles. See id. at 2302.
137. The Board of Review was to be comprised of nine members of Congress, none of
whom were to be reresentatives of Maryland, Virginia, or the District of Columbia. See 49
U.S.C. App. § 2456(f) (1988). These members were to serve in their individual capacities as
representatives of airport users. Id.
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Citizens for the Abatement of Aircraft Noise, Inc. ("CAAN"), a
local citizen's group, challenged the constitutionality of the Board, in
part because of a plan for the renovation and development of National
Airport adopted by the regional authority and accepted by the
Board.'38 The District Court for the District of Columbia granted the
defendants' motion for summary judgment, holding that there was no
violation of the separation of powers doctrine because the members of
the Board of Review were to act in their individual capacities. 139 The
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed,
because it considered the Board of Review a violation of "the consti-
tutional prohibition, articulated in Bowsher, against legislative agents
performing executive functions."'" On certiorari, the Supreme Court
held that the retention of the review power in the Board of Review, to
which Congress delegated legislative power to deal with the airports,
was inappropriate under the separation of powers doctrine.'41
In reaching its decision, the Court declined to decide whether the
power exercised by the Review Board was legislative or executive, as
the Court of Appeals had done. Instead, it decided that if the power
was executive, Congress could not, according to Bowsher, authorize
its agents to perform the acts required.'42 Alternatively, if the power
was legislative, the Court held that Congress, pursuant to Chadha,
must exercise that power "in conformity with the bicameralism and
presentment requirements of Art. I, § 7."''14 The Court thus con-
strued the Constitution and its own separation of powers decisions,
applied them to the facts of Metropolitan Washington Airports in a
formal manner, and determined that Congress must not go outside
the constitutionally prescribed separation of powers limits.
Metropolitan Washington Airports has clear parallels to the the-
ory advanced by this Article. The Court would not have prevented
Congress from retaining more legislative power over the airports if it
did so by enacting laws in the normal fashion. Similarly, Congress
may legislate tax laws with detail. The only question is whether it is
actually doing so. If Congress does not, and it simply passes more
general laws and delegates administrative detail to its own staff rather
138. Metropolitan Washington Airports, IIl S. Ct. at 2304-05.
139. Citizens for the Abatement of Aircraft Noise v. Metropolitan Washington Airports
Auth., 718 F. Supp. 974, 985 (D.D.C. 1989), rev'd, 917 F.2d 48 (D.C. Cir. 1990), aff'd, 111 S.
Ct. 2298 (1991).
140. Citizens for the Abatement of Aircraft Noise v. Metropolitan Washington Airports
Auth., 917 F.2d 48, 57 (D.C. Cir. 1990), aff'd, I11 S. Ct. 2298 (1991).
141. Metropolitan Washington Airports, I11 S. Ct. at 2301.
142. Id. at 2311.
143. Id. at 2312.
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than that of the Treasury, then the Metropolitan Washington Airports
case suggests serious questions about the propriety of such action.
C. Special Legislation
The previous two Subsections discussed indications in constitu-
tional history and Supreme Court decisions that support the conclu-
sion that the separation of powers favors the writing of simpler tax
laws by Congress. This Subsection considers the role of special inter-
ests in the tax legislative process. The focus, unlike that of Professors
Doernberg and McChesney, is on whether the influence of special
interests on the legislative process constitutes a problem under the
separation of powers doctrine.
In addressing this issue, it is important at the outset to distin-
guish between true special-interest legislation and legislation that
reflects a balancing of constituent interests and has a broad impact on
the allocation of the tax burden. For example, there is a distinction
between an affirmative congressional response to lobbying to prevent
the reduction in the section 162 deduction for travel and entertain-
ment expenses and an affirmative response to lobbying for special
relief from the repeal of the investment tax credit.' 4" Some congres-
sional responses fall between these two poles, and it is sometimes diffi-
cult to define their treatment. The difference between them is in the
number of taxpayers affected by the legislation. The essential point is
that Congress may enact a law that benefits some more than others,
but in a fashion that permits the legislative balancing process to work
as it should within the separation of powers. Problems arise where
Congress prevents the legislative balancing process from working.
By focusing on the actual distribution of power among the
branches, a careful examination of the enactment of tax legislation
reveals the tendency for special-interest tax provisions to prevent the
executive branch from exercising its constitutionally prescribed role.
Special legislation, hidden within a long, intricate tax bill, may
deprive the presentment clause of its meaning. As INS v. Chadha
makes clear, the presentment of legislation to the President for signa-
ture or veto remains a meaningful part of the legislative process. 11 It
144. Because a reduction in the deduction for travel and entertainment expenses may well
result in a decrease in jobs as well as profits, a member of Congress from a state with an
economy that is highly dependent on the convention trade may well feel under some obligation
to heed the pleas of hotel and restaurant industry and union lobbyists and resist cutting the
deduction. This, however, is a far cry from trying to satisfy a single, well-heeled and well-
connected constituent who wants special help. See generally BARLEr & STEELE, supra note 9
(discussing provisions enacted to provide such special help).
145. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 946-48 (1983).
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is designed to check the Congress by giving the President the opportu-
nity to assert the national interest in the legislative process. This is
significant because the President, unlike the members of Congress,
was elected by a majority of the entire voting public to represent all of
the people. 146 If the legislation presented to the President is riddled
with special-interest provisions, it is hard to believe that the underly-
ing constitutional reason for presentment is served. If the President
agrees with the general content of the bill, he or she will not veto it
simply because of the special provisions. 47 Thus, the way the tax
legislative process currently works, the President has no opportunity
to curb legislative excesses that are detrimental to the national interest
because they only benefit private interests. In that sense the constitu-
tional rationale for presentment is essentially ignored.
The second way in which the enactment of special legislation
undermines the executive role is more subtle. In a sense, the grant of
a special tax break is analogous to a grant of money or a "tax expendi-
ture" by the Treasury. 148 In general, however, the authority to make
146. See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 123 (1926) ("The President is a representative
of the people just as the members of the Senate and of the House are, and it may be, at some
times, on some subjects, that the President elected by all the people is rather more
representative of them all than are the members of either body of the Legislature whose
constituencies are local and not countrywide .... ").
147. Tax legislation is almost never vetoed, mainly because the executive branch has had
ample opportunity to have its views considered while tax legislation is pending in Congress.
See B. BITrKER, supra note 7, at § 116.2. This is so despite the fact that the President may not
always agree with all the provisions in the legislation. For example, President Carter did not
veto the Crude Oil Windfall Profits Tax Act of 1980, even though it contained a provision
repealing section 1023, the provision for carryover basis at death, which his Administration
had lobbied hard to retain. See Crude Oil Windfall Profits Tax Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-
223, § 401, 94 Stat. 229 (1980).
Professor Bittker makes note of President Franklin Roosevelt's veto of the Revenue Act
of 1943, Pub. L. No. 235, 58 Stat. 21 (1944). See B. BITTKER, supra note 7, at § 54.3.1; see also
R. PAUL, supra note 34, at 143-62 (tracking the development of the 1943 legislation, the
reasons for the veto and the politics of its override by Congress).
It is worthy of note, however, that the general notion that the Treasury's views are given
ample weight during the course of the tax legislative process has diminished recently. See, e.g.,
Cohen, The Role of the Treasury Department in the Federal Tax Legislative Process, 32 NAT'L
TAX J. 256 (1979); Reese, The Politics of Tax Reform, 32 NAT'L TAX J. 248, 249 (1979);
Waris, supra note 7, at 30. If these observations are accurate, it is all the more important that
the veto be a meaningful part of the legislative process.
Of course, problems with presentment are just as apparent in lengthy legislation about any
subject. President Bush's message about the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989,
which he signed despite constitutional concerns about the separation of powers, provides one
cogent example. See President's Statement on Signing the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation
Act of 1989, 25 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1969 (Dec. 19, 1989).
148. For many years there was considerable debate about the concept of tax expenditures,
but now Congress and the commentators seem to have accepted the idea. See Alt, The
Evolution of Tax Structures, 41 Pun. CHOICE 181 (1983); Simon, Budget Process, supra note
22, at 630-34; Thuronyi, Tax Expenditures: A Reassessment, 1988 DUKE L.J. 1155. One of
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grants of money is an inherently executive one,149 normally exercised
under guidelines set out by Congress in general legislation. Thus, for
example, Congress does not decide which scientific researchers will
receive funding for which projects; an administrative agency does,
having been directed to do so by Congress. By writing special tax
laws that allow only a select few to receive monetary benefits in the
form of reduced taxes, Congress exercises an executive power that it
properly should delegate to an agency with the requisite expertise to
make finely tuned determinations of merit. Congress should not uni-
laterally decide which taxpayers are entitled to relief from general
laws because it is poorly suited to perform the detailed administrative
analysis that should precede such selections.
Special tax laws undercut congressional accountability as well.
When Congress writes laws that benefit specific taxpayers and make
exceptions to general rules worked out in the legislative process, it is
not acting as a representative of the people as a whole. Justice Powell,
concurring in INS v. Chadha, summed up this idea by noting that
"[t]he only effective constraint on Congress' power is political, but
Congress is most accountable politically when it prescribes rules of
general applicability .. . 150 Special laws are enacted outside of the
normal legislative process that balances the pluralist interests repre-
sented by the legislators from various regions and localities.",'
Stanley Surrey's principal objections to tax expenditures is that they promote complexity,
which, in turn, undercuts fairness. See Surrey, Complexity and the Internal Revenue Code:
The Problem of the Management of Tax Detail, 34 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 673, 683-85
(1970).
149. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 140 (1976) (per curiam) (listing among the powers
considered to be administrative, as opposed to legislative or judicial in nature, those having to
do with "determinations of eligibility for funds"). Congress ordinarily does not concern itself
with which specific entities are funded under programs administered by executive branch and
independent agencies. Where there is political benefit in such intrusion into the executive
realm, however, Congress may attempt to reap it. Such was the case with the recent
controversy regarding the National Endowment for the Arts. See Kastor, Senate Votes to
Expand NEA Grant Ban, Wash. Post, July 27, 1989, at CI, col. 1.
150. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 966 (1983) (Powell, J., concurring). Powell views the
power retained by Congress in the review of deportation proceedings as judicial rather than
executive. However categorized, it seems clear that particularized decisionmaking of the sort
involved in grants of money to specific individuals is far too detailed a task to be entrusted to
the legislature.
151. In Chadha, the Court which suggested that one of the rationales for the requirements
of bicameralism and presentment was that the Framers were concerned that otherwise the
"special interests could be favored at the expense of public needs ...." INS v. Chadha, 462
U.S. at 950.
Unfavorable press about special tax laws has resulted in a willingness to be more resistant
to private interest lobbying. In the Senate version of the 1986 Act, the Senate itself recognized
the importance of special interest provisions by calling for the publication in the conference
report of the names of the concerns and individuals receiving special or unique treatment. See
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These are the ways in which Congress exercises its power to
write special tax laws and in doing so tends to overstep the boundaries
of legislative power as we understand it. Although lobbying per se is
appropriate in a pluralistic and representative democracy, the special
laws that sometimes stem from such lobbying may be viewed as
underminging the principles embodied in the separation of powers
doctrine. Special interest legislation comes about largely because of
the enormous influence of money in the congressional election pro-
cess. 1- 2 But the complexity of the tax laws that Congress enacts also
enhances the influence of special interests in the tax legislative pro-
cess. It is easier to hide a special law in a complex statute than in a
simple one, concealing it from public scrutiny with arcane lan-
guage. 153 This suggests that if Congress wrote simpler laws, the influ-
ence of special interests in the tax legislative process would be reduced
considerably.
D. The Nondelegation Doctrine
The remaining constitutional issue is the impact of the nondele-
gation doctrine on this separation of powers thesis. Although many
scholars view the nondelegation doctrine as outmoded in the current
administrative state, 5 4 its underlying theory is basic to our constitu-
H.R. 3838, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. § 1711, as passed by the Senate. Unfortunately the provision
was not adopted by the Conference. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 841, 99th Cong., 2nd Sess. II-
840 (1986).
Congressional Quarterly estimated that the 1986 Act spent $10.6 billion on special
provisions in the law that paid back "political favors granted to gain votes for the bill." See
Congress Enacts Sweeping Overhaul of Tax Law, 50 CONG. ALMANAC 491, 524 (1986). The
story reported Senator Metzenbaum's role in publicizing the estimated 682 special transition
rules public, something entirely unprecedented. For a more detailed report of some of the
special rules, see BARLETT & STEELE, supra note 9.
In addition to unfavorable publicity, the revenue concerns generated by the budget deficit
and the importance of revenue neutrality have made the enactment of special rules increasingly
difficult. See Jones & Rosenthal, Rostenkowski Sets Ground Rules for Members' Amendments
to Tax Bill; Markup to Resume Next Week, 44 TAX NOTES 1063 (1989). But there is little
reason to believe that it will not be business as usual once the budget concerns subside.
152. See, e.g., P. STERN, THE BEST CONGRESS MONEY CAN BuY (1989); Doernberg &
McChesney, Book Review, supra note 5, at 896-99; Sabato, The Political Parties and PACs:
Novel Relationships in the New System of Campaign Finance, 3 J.L. & POL. 423 (1987). For a
discussion of the net gains and losses experienced when targeted transition rules are enacted,
see Ramseyer & Nakazato, Tax Transitions and the Protection Racket: A Reply to Professors
Graetz and Kaplow, 75 VA. L. REV. 1155 (1989).
153. For marvelous anecdotal evidence of this from the 1986 Act, see BARTLETT &
STEELE, supra note 9. For an earlier bit of muckraking in this area, see P. STERN, THE RAPE
OF THE TAXPAYER 34-59 (1973).
154. See, e.g., S. BARBER, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE DELEGATION OF
CONGRESSIONAL POWER 11-41 (1975); K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 2.02
(1958); Mashaw, Prodelegation: Why Administrators Should Make Political Decisions, 1 J. L.
ECON, & ORGANIZATION 81 (1985).
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tional scheme. Nonetheless, recent cases that have considered the
issue of inappropriate congressional delegation to agencies have not
invalidated those legislative schemes.' 5 'Indeed, the only important
cases to suggest the viability of the doctrine were ones in which the
Court exhibited its general hostility to the New Deal.'56 But the idea
of nondelegation is not devoid of substance even at the present, and
there are those who urge its resurrection in a more impressive form.'"
In the tax area, considering whether nondelegation is even an
issue may seem incongruous with the broad general delegation of
rulemaking authority to the Secretary of the Treasury found in Sec-
tion 7805(a) of the Internal Revenue Code. 5 ' In addition, the delega-
tions of specific regulatory power in many instances'59 suggest that
155. See Skinner v. Mid-America Pipeline Co., 109 S. Ct. 1726 (1989) (upholding
delegation to the Secretary of Transportation to establish a schedule of pipeline saftey user
fees); Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 660 (1989) (upholding constitutionality of the
Sentencing Commission); Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467
U.S. 837 (1984) (approving broad delegation to the Environmental Protection Agency with
respect to environmental matters); Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen v.
Connally, 337 F. Supp. 737 (D.D.C. 1971) (holding that wage and price controls may be
delegated to the President).
156. See, e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co. 298 U.S. 238 (1936) (invalidating parts of the
Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of 1935, ch. 824, 49 Stat. 991, on the theory that its
delegation to private parties violated due process);A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United
States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (invalidating section 3 of the National Industrial Recovery Act of
1933 (NIRA), ch. 90, 48 Stat. 195, as not supplying adequate standards); Panama Refining Co.
v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935) (invalidating section 9(c) of NIRA as not fixing policy or
standards).
157. See Aranson, Gellhorn & Robinson, supra note 16, at 36-37, 63-67.
158. I.R.C. § 7805(a) (1990). For a general dicussion of the scope of the delegation and the
legal effect of regulations promulgated under the general authority contained in Section
7805(a) and the specific regulatory authority contained in an ever-increasing number of
statutes, see B. BITTKER, supra note 7, at § 110.4.
159. For example, section 338(e)(5) of the Internal Revene Code authorizes the Secretary to
issue certain regulations "[w]henever necessary to carry out the purpose of this subsection and
subsection (0" I.R.C. § 338(e)(5) (1990). Section 338(i) authorizes the Secretary to "prescribe
such regulations as may be necessary or appropriate to carry out the purposes of this section,"
and it specifies with that the regulations should prevent the circumvention of consistent
treatment between stock and asset purchases "through the use of any provision of law or
regulations." In addition, the section requires the coordination of section 338 provisions
relating to foreign corporations and their shareholders. Id.; see also I.R.C. § 337(d) (1990)
(authorizing regulations to "carry out the purposes" of the provisions repealing the General
Utilities doctrine, including regulations that will "ensure that such purposes may not be
circumvented through the use of any provision of law or regulations").
In the legislative history of the 1989 legislation there is a sweeping delegation to change
the law as enacted by Congress. Thus, with reference to the amendments to section 163
contained in section 7210 of the Act (the new "earnings stripping" rules), Congress permitted
Treasury wide latitude in the way it should write its regulations to define statutory provisions
and to amend the statutory definitions of certain terms:
The conferees are aware of the complexity of the legal issues involved in this
matter and the possible evolution of the international standards for identifying
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nondelegation may be irrelevant in the tax field. That is not necessar-
ily the case. The requirement of the nondelegation cases that the
grant of authority to the executive branch contain an "intelligible pur-
pose" of the congressional intent is designed to ensure that Congress
has in fact retained the policy-making power inherent in legislating."6
That requirement applies to the tax area as well as other areas of
governance.
The nondelegation doctrine requires Congress to make broad tax
policy choices in accordance with its role under the separation of
powers. However, that does not suggest that Congress may not direct
the Treasury Department to write rules and make more specific tax
policy choices in the process.1 61 Under this theory, Congress could
not, for example, delegate the authority to set tax rates to the Treas-
ury, even though the Supreme Court has upheld a statutory grant of
rate-setting authority to the President in the customs area. 62 Con-
gress could decide, however, that a zero rate of tax will apply to the
exempt function income of charitable groups, leaving it to the Treas-
ury to define both "exempt function income" and "charitable
purposes."1
63
Writing simpler tax laws is appropriate under the nondelegation
doctrine for two reasons. First, were Congress not to legislate with as
much specificity as it currently does, the Treasury might not "leap
into the gap" and write complicated regulations. If it did not, there
thin capitalization. The conferees have therefore granted authority to Treasury
to make appropriate adjustments, by regulation, to the definitions applicable to
debt equity (sic), net interest expense, and adjusted taxable income so that the
application of the statute will be consistent with the concept of thin capitalization
as described above.
160. See Aranson, Gellhorn & Robinson, supra note 16, at 7-17; Farina, supra note 33, at
478-79, 497-98.
161. For a similar analysis, see Mashaw, supra note 152.
162. See J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394 (1928) (upholding
delegation of power to the President to increase a congressionally established tariff schedule to
equalize differences in the costs of production between the United States and competing
countries). The power was granted pursuant to the Tariff Act of 1922, ch. 356, § 315(a), 42
Stat. 858. The Court relied on an earlier case, Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892) (upholding a
delegation with respect to the tariff power to determine when an increase in tariffs was
appropriate; the rate in that instance had been set by Congress). See also Amalgamated Meat
Cutters & Butcher Workmen v. Connally, 337 F. Supp. 737 (D.D.C. 1971) (sustaining the
delegation of wage and price control power to the President).
163. See Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983) (requiring the IRS to
determine whether a school violates public policy with respect to racial discrimination in order
to decide whether it should be given tax exempt status under section 501(c)(3)). The Court
applied the public policy requirement to religious schools on the theory that they are required
to be "charitable" within the generally accepted meaning of the term even though they are
religious as well. Id. at 585-96. See generally Simon, The Tax-Exempt Status of Racially
Discriminatory Religious Schools, 36 TAX L. REV. 477 (1981).
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would be two effects. One would be that the vague statutory rules
written by Congress might inhibit certain undesirable taxpayer behav-
ior. There is considerable anecdotal evidence to suggest that taxpay-
ers and their advisors believe, clear rules provide planning
opportunities but vague proscriptions (such as section 269) unduly
limit their choices."6 The other effect would be that the judicial pro-
cess would begin to once again play a significant part in the develop-
ment of tax laws. Neither outcome is altogether inappropriate. In
fact, the revitalization of the judiciary's role may be more desirable
than most commentators from tax practice believe.
165
Second, the development of the nondelegation doctrine in the set-
ting of the administrative state suggests that delegation to administra-
tive bodies is appropriate where there are adequate external controls
and where the internal policymaking mechanisms provide for ade-
quate due process of law. Voluminous literature supports this
theory. 166
1. EXTERNAL CONTROLS
In the context of internal revenue statutes, Congress has not been
shy to exercise its power to oversee the Treasury and the IRS.
167
164. I.R.C. § 269(a) (1990). Section 269(a) permits the Secretary to disallow certain tax
benefits that occur as a result of an acquisition if the acquisition was made for the principal
purpose of evading or avoiding federal taxes. Id.
165. See, e.g., L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 556-64 (1965);
Farina, supra note 33, at 500-02. With respect to the role that courts may play in the
interpretation of the tax laws (in particular, Section 385 of the Code), Charles Lyon
commented:
One might say that this is one of those areas of tax law where the virtues of
vagueness exceed its vices; that courts must look to all the facts and
circumstances of each case to see what is really 'intended' or what has
'substantial economic reality'; and that it is salutary to tell taxpayers only that
there is a danger zone which they enter at their peril.
Lyon, Federal Income Taxation, ANN. SURV. AM. L. 123, 142 (1957); see also Merrill, The
Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1985) (discussing the appropri-
ate separation of powers theory to be applied to federal courts' interpretation of statutes). On
the other hand, tax practitioners view with horror the intervention of more courts in the inter-
pretation of tax statutes. See, e.g., Ferguson, Hickman & Lubick, supra note 7, at 806 ("It is
not acceptable-at least not usually-to paint with extrabroad brush strokes and expect the
courts to fill in all the details. The judiciary, to be candid, is not competent to flesh out such a
vast and "technically integrated system."). But see Salem, supra note 47, at 170 (noting that
almost 80% of Tax Court judges are former government lawyers and questioning whether it
makes "any sense to assume that they are not capable of sorting out a complex issue").
166. See, e.g., L. JAFFE, supra note 163, at 57-72; Bruff, Legislative Formality,
Administrative Rationality, 63 TEX. L. REV. 207 (1984); Farina, supra note 32, at 502-11;
Strauss, supra note 52, at 625.
167. See supra note 81, (describing the oversight powers of Congress, in general, and of the
Ways and Means and Finance Committees, in particular).
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Recent history divulges a number of instances in which congressional
oversight has been effective, 168 and some instances in which it has
been used to pass political blame onto administrators for decisions
that were, in fact, the fault of Congress. 169 In addition, Congress has
used its appropriations power to exercise control over the regulatory
processes without actually passing laws to give greater guidance to the
Treasury as to congressional intent. For instance, Congress has
attached "riders" to some legislation, specifying the purposes for
which appropriated funds could be spent, or prohibiting any expendi-
ture for certain types of programs. 170 Other means of control, such as
168. One example of such congressional oversight occurred in July 1986, when the
administration expressed concerns about the avoidance of the federal tax on gasoline, and the
Ways and Means Oversight Subcommittee held a hearing to consider proposals for
enforcement under the then-existing law and proposals for revamping the enforcement scheme.
See Daily Tax Rep. (BNA) No. 129, at 135 (1986); Hanlon, Oversight Subcommittee
Investigates Gasoline Tax Evasion, 32 TAX NOTES 201 (1986). Another example arose in the
context of a decision by the IRS to grant tax-exempt status to Prince Edward Academy, which
resulted in the publication of new guidelines for the awarding of tax-exempt status when racial
discrimination is an issue. See Egger Clarifies Guidelines for Private School Exemption, 64 J.
TAX'N 295 (1986).
169. Congress can be astonishingly inept and lacking in understanding of the statutes it
writes. One example is the amendment of section 274(d) by the Tax Reform Act of 1984, Pub.
L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 494. Pursuant to the general section 7805(a) authority, the Treasury
issued Treas. Reg. § 1.274-5T (1984), to give guidance as to the meaning of the change in
section 274. The statute as amended required taxpayers to keep "adequate contemporaneous
records" of their use of personal vehicles for business purposes in order to be entitled to the
deduction under section 162. The IRS interpretation, which required that a "log, journal,
diary or other similar record" be kept, evoked a firestorm, of controversy. Members of
Congress blamed the IRS rather than themselves, even though there is no question that the
IRS interpretation was a reasonable one in light of the way the statute was drafted. See
Timberlake, Congressional Panels Hear Pros and Cons of Repealing Auto Log Requirements, 26
TAX NOTES 960 (1985).
170. The constitutionality of such riders has been questioned. See Parnell, supra note 79, at
1377-80; Strauss, Separation of Powers, supra note 52, at 446 n.63. Others assert that such
riders constitute a valid use of the appropriations power. See J. SUNDQUIST, supra note 83, at
221. What little authority there is on this point suggests that the latter view is correct. See,
e.g., Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (sustaining the Hyde Amendment, which forbid the
use of federal funds for abortions, against various constitutional challenges without raising the
question of whether the amendment violated the separation of powers). As the Eleventh
Circuit noted in a subsequent case, "When the Supreme Court reversed [the] injunction [in
McRae v. Califano, 491 F. Supp. 630 (E.D.N.Y., 1980)], it gave no indication that the district
court's order was invalid because of limits imposed on HHS by the Constitution's
appropriations clause .... " Georgia Dep't of Medical Assistance v. Hekier, 767 F.2d 1293,
1296 (1 1th Cir. 1985); see also National Treasury Employees Union v. Devine, 733 F.2d 114
(D.C. Cir. 1984) (holding that a direction that "no funds be spent" for implementation of a
specified rule made the rule "null and void" during the period covered by the appropriations
legislation).
Whether or not they are constitutional, appropriations act riders may, in certain
instances, render the administration of the tax laws totally impossible for extended periods of
time. With respect to the fringe benefits area, discussed by Parnell, supra, at 1380, the use of
such riders brought attempts to provide guidance for consistent nationwide enforcement
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the requirement that the Treasury issue nonregulatory or informal
guidance, 17 or that it write reports on certain topics to be submitted
to the Congress at a specific time, 172 give Congress the opportunity to
keep a close eye on the process of executing the laws it writes.
The judiciary provides the other external control over the admin-
istrative process. Although there is a tradition of deference in the tax
area for those Treasury decisions that have been in existence for some
time 73 or are issued contemporaneously with the passage of a stat-
ute, 174 the courts occassionally have struck down a regulation for not
being in accord with congressional intent. 75  There are indications
outside the tax area that suggest problems with judicial deference to
agency rulemaking, 76 but at least at this point, judicial deference is
standards to a standstill for nearly ten years. See Simon, Fringe Benefits and Tax Reform:
Historical Blunders and a Proposal for Structural Change, 36 U. FLA. L. REV. 871, 879 n. 14
(1984). Thus, whatever virtue they may have, appropriations. act riders should be used
sparingly and not for extended periods of time. If Congress is concerned about how the
Treasury has exercised its delegated power, it should promptly give the executive branch
guidance as to how it could do better rather than simply telling it not to do what it has
attempted to do. For a general discussion of appropriations controls over agencies, see
Macmahon, Congressional Oversight ofAdministration: The Power of the Purse II, 58 POL. SCi.
REV. 911 (1960).
171. The Ways and Means Committee Report accompanying the Financial Institutions
Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989 (the S&L bailout bill) specifically addresses
the issuance of such guidance in addition to regulations, rulings, revenue procedures and other
admnistrative pronouncements. The Report notes that "the committee expects that the
Internal Revenue Service will, in appropriate cases, provide private letter rulings on specific
transactions prior to any such published authority being issued." H.R. REP. No. 54, 101st
Cong., 1st Sess., Pt. 2, 25 (1989).
172. Tax Notes has compiled a listing of Treasury tax studies that have been completed or
that are mandated but have not been completed. See 46 TAx NOTES 13, 13-15 (1990). At the
date of the compilation of the list, some 26 mandated studies were still outstanding, but the
Treasury hoped to reduce that number, and the fact that the Budget Reconciliation Act of
1990 mandated only one such study was viewed as a hopeful sign. See Hubbard, Treasury
Looks to Shrink Backlog of Mandated Tax Studies, 46 TAx NOTES 12 (1990).
173. See, e.g., Helvering v. Winmill, 305 U.S. 79, 83 (1938) ("Treasury regulations and
interpretations long continued without substantial change, applying to unamended or
substantially reenacted statutes, are deemed to have received congressional approval and have
the effect of law.").
174. See, e.g., Commissioner v. South Texas Lumber Co., 333 U.S. 496, 501 (1948) ("This
Court has many times declared that Treasury regulations must be sustained unless
unreasonable and plainly inconsistent with the revenue statutes and that they constitute
contemporaneous constructions by those charged with the administration of the statutes which
should not be overruled except for weighty reasons.").
175. See, e.g., Big Mama Rag v. United States, 631 F.2d 1030 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (invalidating
longstanding regulations promulgated under section 501(c)(3) to define "educational" on the
ground that its "full and fair exposition" standard was unconstitutionally vague); Tilford v.
Commissioner, 75 T.C. 134 (1980), rev'd, 705 F.2d 828 (6th Cir., 1983) (holding Treas. Reg.
§ 1.83-6(d) (1978) invalid as not being an appropriate interpretation of legislative intent).
176. See, e.g., Diver, Statutory Interpretation in the Administrative State, 133 U. PA. L.
REV. 549 (1985); Farina, supra note 33, at 464-68; Gerwin, The Deference Dilemma: Judicial
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still relevant to taxation statutes.
2. DUE PROCESS
Delegation may be proper when certain constraints on the
agency exist to ensure procedural due process for individual citizens
affected by agency behavior. The Administrative Procedure Act
("APA"), which applies to executive departments as well as
independent agencies, provides for certain procedures that must be
followed both with respect to agency adjudication and to agency
rulemaking." Of course, the IRS and the Treasury meet both these
APA requirements. Thus, it seems clear that the due process safe-
guard applies to delegations in the tax area.
More fundamentally, however, the Treasury Department's pro-
cess of promulgating new regulations may allow affected citizens a
greater opportunity for participation in executive-branch lawmaking
than the congressional rules permit for its legislation. The reason for
this is fairly simple: tax bills are generally long and complicated and
contain many provisions. Few of these will have been considered by
the committees in hearings. Even fewer will have been thought
through by the members of Congress themselves unless their particu-
lar constituents have an interest in them and have brought them to
the members' attention.
17 8
Treasury regulations, on the other hand, no matter how long and
complicated, are directed to a single subject: the interpretation of one
statute. Thus, it is easier to target taxpayer response. In addition, it
can be targeted by a person who understands precisely what the issues
and concerns are and can rationally balance the concerns of accuracy
and fairness. Although it does not ensure that a person who is
electorally accountable has actual control over the outcome, delega-
tion of administrative detail to the Treasury staff is designed to ensure
a measure of fairness that delegation to the congressional staff does
not. The application of the APA and other procedural safeguards to
the rulemaking process within the Treasury Department satisfies the
due process requirement and permits delegation so long as Congress
Responses to the Great Legislative Power Giveaway, 14 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 289 (1987);
Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1983); Rubin, supra
note 33, at 407. For a general discussion about judicial deference in the tax area, in the context
of an article arguing for striking down loss allowance regulations, see Salem, supra note 47, at
168-76.
177. See Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (with respect to
rulemaking); id. §§ 554-558 (with respect to adjudications).








This Aricle presents a separation of powers analysis of the federal
tax legislative process and the Congress's control over the federal tax-
ing power. The analysis suggests that, were it to write simpler tax
laws, Congress would exercise its control of taxation in a way that
more closely accords with the doctrine embodied in the separation of
powers among the three branches and the checks and balances within
the system.
The critique of other critics of the tax legislative process points
out problems associated with that process are more fundamental than
those commentators have realized. Nonetheless, the problem of Con-
gress's failure to exercise its legislative power appropriately can be
corrected by simpler modes of legislative expression rather than
greater controls on its activities. The major concern that Congress is
"out of control" in the tax area can be addressed by questioning its
proper role under the separation of powers. The way the government
works to extract taxes from the citizens is naturally a matter of great
import. The analysis suggests that fairness would be enhanced if Con-
gress writes simpler tax laws, thereby giving the executive branch
greater opportunity to participate in the lawmaking process by flesh-
ing out the administrative details that Congress currently delegates to
its own staff.
179. There is one additional reason to believe that broad delegations to
administrators might improve responsiveness. . . . Administrators at least
operate within a set of legal rules (administrative law) that keep them within
their jurisdiction, require them to operate with a modicum of explanation and
participation of the affected interests, police them for consistency, and protect
them from the importuning of congressmen and others who would like to carry
logrolling into the administrative process. In short, if we are uncertain about the
responsiveness of majority rule voting procedures to citizens' or even legislators'
desires, perhaps vague delegations to administrators can be a technique for
avoiding the more disheartening aspects of the alternatives.
Mashaw, supra note 152, at 99.
1991] 1049
